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West Europe Report

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13 November 1984

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STALINIST PAPER ON MEANING OF CRUISE MISSILES FOR FINLAND

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 27 Sep 84 p 2

/Editorial: "U.S. Missiles and Finland"/

/Text/ NATO has quickly adapted the new American intermediate-range missiles to its nuclear strike force. The readiness for instant use of both cruise and Pershing missiles has been increased throughout the year, and the first intermediate-range missiles were included in NATO's military exercises this autumn.

This indicates that NATO intends to stick to its previously arranged timetable in accordance with which altogether nearly 600 new American missiles will be placed in Western Europe in the next few years. Nothing at this moment indicates that the United States, any more than its NATO allies, would be willing to revise the missile decision and thereby reopen the door to negotiations on Euromissiles.

The danger created by U.S. missiles is thus growing, and it has wide effects both internationally and regionally. Finland, too, has fallen into a danger zone because of the cruise missiles in particular, since their trajectories are designed to pierce our country's airspace. It is therefore natural that Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Tikhonov brought up the subject of the U.S. missile threat when he met with Prime Minister Sorsa in Moscow.

The issue directly affects both countries' joint security interests. Tikhonov also stated that deployment of the missiles has weakened everyone's security and that the Soviet Union understands the concern Finland feels for the possibility of American missiles violating our country's airspace.

Since a similar view on this question was presented a year ago in connection with Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen's official visit to Moscow, there is no ambiguity about how much emphasis the Soviet leadership places on the danger created by the U.S. missiles and to what extent it expects Finland to cooperate in neutralizing the threat which has taken shape.

One problem is that an official assessment of the altered security situation and the measures it requires has not been made in Finland. This kind of task belongs to a parliamentary defense committee; the guidelines drawn up in its

previous report have become obsolete in this respect. If and when a new committee is appointed, its most important job will be to outline all available means by which our country can protect itself from the U.S. missile threat.

In this case it is very worthwhile, as already suggested in the public debate, for our country to closely examine all the possibilities offered by the YYA /Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance/ Agreement to improve our antimissile capacity.

Another factor which strengthens Finland's security is advancement of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Nordic countries. Although promotion of the plan has encountered difficulties from both the United States and the Nordic NATO countries, this is no reason to reduce diplomatic and political efforts to achieve the goal. It is unfortunate that the plan for such a zone has not been brought up on Finland's initiative at the CSCE meeting in Stockholm. After all, it would be a natural forum to handle the issue, especially since all the states whose guarantees are needed for the zone are right there.

12327

CSO: 3617/9

SWEDISH PROPOSAL FOR RADIOLOGICAL MATERIALS BAN VIEWED

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 12 Oct 84 p 2

[Commentary by Ann Rehnberg]

[Text] Geneva--The Swedish delegation to the arms control conference in Geneva is a small group of people--but it is working in high gear. Recently it presented a proposal for an agreement on a ban on using radiological materials for the purpose of mass destruction. With an important addition.

"Radiological materials for the purpose of mass destruction" sounds awkward. In simple terms it means the dissemination of radioactive substances in large quantities, something that could happen in a future war.

In the mid-1970's the Soviet Union and the United States submitted their own agreement on a ban on the use of radiological weapons for the purpose of mass destruction to the arms control conference. The reception by other countries was not entirely positive. Critics suspected that the superpowers were trying to "deceive the world."

About 5 years ago Sweden took the initiative on this issue. A future agreement should in the view of the Swedish delegation be supplemented with a ban on attacks on nuclear energy plants. This idea has gradually become known as Track B to distinguish it from the original proposed ban, which is known as Track A.

Initially this ran into opposition from the superpowers. They did not think Track B was an arms control issue but that it belonged more to what are generally called the "rules of war."

But the Swedish idea was well received by neutral and nonallied countries. The problem was then to bring both matters together in the same agreement, to link them together.

In June the Swedish delegation was able to present this kind of coordinated proposal. It calls for a ban on the dissemination of radiological materials with certain important additions and clarifications. Mass destruction is the issue. Therefore it does not matter where the material is produced--in the

target country (destruction of nuclear energy plants) or in the attacking nation (the dissemination of radiological materials).

The Swedes believe that the so-called ban on usage is important. It would make it impossible to blame future attacks on military targets where there "happen" to be nearby civilian targets on a "mistake."

The Swedish proposal does not distinguish between military and civilian targets and facilities. The proposal also calls for international inspection of nuclear energy facilities desired by any state that produce over a certain amount of energy, as defined in the proposed agreement. The nations concerned would report where these civilian and military facilities are located.

Not so surprisingly it has turned out that some people regard military nuclear energy facilities as military targets--which should be exempted from the inspection requirements for that reason.

At the same time it can be said that an open reporting system--including military facilities--should benefit both potential assailants and those who might be attacked. Better balance could be achieved in this way. Thus it is clever to link international inspection requirements with the ban on using radiological materials. But it calls for some consideration.

What good will it do the world if the superpowers with their "overkill capacity" decide to sign such an agreement?

Quite a lot. Primarily, of course, such an agreement would represent a substantial degree of protection for small nations.

Next year the nuclear nations that signed the nonproliferation agreement will meet for a review conference. Signing an agreement banning the use of radiological weapons would be a plus for the superpowers. Or as the Swedish arms control delegation's military expert, Colonel Hans Berglund, put it:

"Our proposal has nothing to do with the use of nuclear weapons. It concerns avoiding the release of radioactive materials without using nuclear weapons. One must bear in mind that it is very difficult to cause a radioactive emission without high technology and precision-guided weapons."

Words are important in this context. Negotiations take time. Neither Hans Berglund nor Geneva delegation leader Rolf Ekeus nor negotiator Elisabeth Bonnier has taken more than a few days off this year.

We ought to be grateful for that.

6578

CSO: 3650/29

PROBLEMS IN RELATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION VIEWED

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 8 Oct 84 p 3

[Article by Andreas Unterberger, member of the editorial board: "Vienna and the Tail of the Bear: Before a Series of Critical Decisions of Austria in Its Relations with Moscow"]

[Text] Vienna. How irritated is the Soviet Union at present with Austria? The correct answer in all likelihood lies somewhere in the middle--between "very much" and "not at all". Even if one finds indications in both directions at present. Excessive nervousness would perhaps be indicated by the reporting of a Vienna mass circulation newspaper, which--on the basis of a few VOLKSSTIMME contributions--began to formulate militant headlines. If the urge to increase circulation pushed aside the foreign policy realities here, the urge of the politicians in the direction of appeasement gestures, on the other hand, painted a far too pretty picture. The relationship between Moscow and Vienna, without a doubt, involves a few question marks.

A point on which basically foreign policy experts from the two big camps are agreed. While a VP [OeVP = Austrian People's Party] man, with reference to the KP [Communist Party], formulates it as follows: "Moscow allows the tail to wag", an expert of the domestic political opposition regards critical reports of East European correspondents and now the taking over of KPOe [Austrian Communist Party] declarations by PRAVDA as a "clear warning". In the East European journalistic arsenal, the taking over of articles and declarations of foreign fraternal parties undoubtedly still ranges in the more harmless range. But nevertheless the present tactic of the Soviets does represent an escalation compared to previous months, when the Americans were still the only evil ones, who attempted to put the brave, neutral Austrians under pressure. Now the Austrians are already clearly the evil ones. And not only the opposition or individual media, but also the foreign minister and the federal president.

After the taking over of Austrian Communist Party declarations by PRAVDA, i. e., the Soviet party organ, an intervention of the Soviet government organ is conceivable as the next step, an intervention which could then culminate in contributions of a traditionally high-ranking pseudonym. All of this, however, would for time being remain only on the media level, against which diplomatic countermeasures are just as impossible to take as, say,

against declarations of an Austrian party, which does damage to the interests of Austria.

However, whether the Soviets really continue to climb up the escalation ladder is pure speculation. After all, at the end of November the official Sinovats visit is imminent, before which an intensified campaign would after all be more than unusual. Conjectures that the still missing official announcement of the trip by the Soviets--although all details have long been settled--has a political background, are not yet taken seriously by Austrian diplomats. They rather believe in a connection with the questionable state of health of the Soviet chief of state and chief of party Chernenko. In this matter the people in Vienna sooner assume that the Soviets are preparing a double strategy for the Sinovats visit: A combination of a not unattractive economic package with admonishing demands that Vienna should in no case leave the proven path of the hitherto existing neutrality policy.

Thus far there have also been no official Soviet interventions because of the new developments in Austrian foreign policy. However, representatives of the Soviet Union have already on several occasions engaged in a concerned "exchange of opinions" with Austrians. In the course of which they expressed their indisposition about a whole list of things, which quite certainly would divert Austria from its policy that has so often found the praise of the Kremlin.

Multiple Dilemma of the Communists

The list consists of the most diverse decisions and declarations: There one finds the now settled purchase of interceptor aircraft; the possibility that, in so doing, equipment from a NATO-state would be acquired; the acquisition of Austrian defensive missiles, described as in the long run indispensable by Defense Minister Frischenschlager; the desire for full membership in the EEC expressed by Vice Chancellor as well as deputy of the Austrian People's Party, Khol (in connection with which the Politburo of the Austrian Communist Party interestingly attacked only Khol in public); the fact that, in his first declarations, Foreign Minister Gratz emphasized no longer the relations to the four state treaty powers, but those to the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (whereby suddenly the Chinese became equivalent to the Soviets); and finally the American pressures in the direction of a very tight control of the Austrian firms trading with the East.

In the course of which, fortunately for Vienna, the Soviets and their Austrian friends at once repeatedly are caught in a dilemma with their arguments: If Moscow makes too much noise in matters of interceptor aircraft and technology transfer, another internal Austrian propaganda line collapses as a result of the Soviet interest which thus becomes evident: Namely that the new interceptor aircraft are militarily completely meaningless anyhow and that, moreover, there is not illegal technology transfer in Austria. Another inconsistency is apparent from the declaration of the Politburo of the Austrian Communist Party. There one finds in direct sequence the sentences: "There is no threat from the East." And: "The acquisition of interception aircraft and missiles for the Bundesheer [federal army] is superfluous. . ." Thus apparently it is clear also to the Austrian Communist

Party that only a threat from the East would be dangerous for Austria; a Western threat is not mentioned at all.

Other strange aspects of communist propaganda, however, give rise to greater concern: For example, the assertion that neutrality is the basic prerequisite of Austrian sovereignty--from which the logical deduction could be made that Austria in the case of violation (of the Soviet conceptions of) its neutrality, would no longer have a claim to sovereignty. And elsewhere one even finds the formulation: "The neutrality law, however, does not speak of a military defense of the country." The formulation of the constitutional law on neutrality, which Austria will "maintain and defend with all means available to it", accordingly appears to signify only the adoption of the Soviet "peace policy".

For the time being, however, as indicated, it is only the tail which Moscow lets wag. Nevertheless, the problem list persists and Austrian foreign policy remains confronted with the main question: Does a completely conflict-free relationship to the Soviet Union continue to be the supreme maxim of Austrian foreign policy, or are people prepared, in issues essential for Austria, to risk a dispute with the Soviet Union if necessary?

Basically it cannot be a question: Austria must carefully and with extreme caution come up with a package encompassing all the problems in question. And, indeed, this would have to happen quickly and quietly, and without a doubt this would have to be supported by the consensus of all parties. In so doing, a list of priorities could do without those things that would represent a superfluous provocation. This might include a No to an aircraft purchase in a NATO country, but likewise also the refusal of a repeated discussion about an EEC membership. Precisely with respect to the last-mentioned point every conceivable mistake, after all, was made by Austria itself through an exceedingly damaging form of Austrian domestic argumentation during the Pittermann era and through the neglect of possible chances during the detente period around 1975. Equally superfluous as a new EEC debate is also a rhetorical change from four to five great powers which stand in the foreground as far as Austria is concerned.

Questions of Life and Death Against Trade With the East

On the other hand, however, missiles are indispensable for a credible national defense. And likewise Austria, probably sooner obeying necessity and not its own inclination, must find a settlement of the technology dispute with the Americans. In both cases military as well as economic questions of life and death are involved, which cannot be abolished even through the possible counterthreat of the elimination of Austrian exports to the East. And to relegate a solution to the end of the line until the arrival of better times, i. e., to wait for a new era of detente, as is being suggested by many socialists, is after all unrealistic. Nobody knows if and when there will be a relaxation of tension. Moreover, from the standpoint of domestic policy, it is impossible to convince the population of the necessity of an improved national defense during the climax of a phase of detente euphoria. So that the Bundesheer [federal army] would end up in a vicious circle of increased tension and detente arguments.

Austria must not and shall not constantly pinch the bear's tail, as Julius Raab warned already at the beginning of the 1950's in his fight for the state treaty. On the other hand, it certainly must not let itself be blackmailed by the most recent line of argumentation of the Soviets: He who is not on the side of the Soviet Union is on the other side.

8970

CSO: 3620/61

INTERNAL RIVALRIES IN PSC, CVP PARTIES HAMPER GOVERNMENT

Brussels LE SOIR in French 24 Sep 84 p 2

[Article by Guy Depas: "Internal Rivalries Within the PSC and the CVP Hinder Progress in Martens' Projects"]

[Text] Establishment of the final text of two draft reform bills arising from the famous conclaves of Val-Duchesse is causing internal frictions among the Christian factions within the government.

It is true that the CVP [Dutch language, Christian People's Party] and the PSC [French language, Christian Social Party] are inspired by concern for ideological recentering, which no doubt makes more obvious today the sacrifices they agreed upon two months earlier in order to advance the cause of government unity on the subject of social reforms: unemployment, health-disability insurance, deregulation, etc.

Because Liberal intransigence forces them to go further than they would like towards putting into concrete form the principles accepted in July, both Dehaene, CVP, Secretary for Social Affairs, and Hansenne, PSC, Secretary for Employment and Labor, seem to be on tenter-hooks....

Will difficulties in settling these problems result in failure to respect the agreed schedule? Obviously it is on this point that their "partners" are lying in wait for the Christians, repeating in September what they said in July: that it is out of the question to break away from the agreement on simultaneity: the draft reform bills, the general report on the Ways and Means budget for 1985 and the draft program bill which accompanies it, should all be submitted and examined at the same time.

All these documents should, in principle, be made available to the Houses at the very beginning of the new term, that is 9 October. The time limit is very short, they say, to complete this work which has not yet progressed very far and which, following the indispensable arbitration between the CVP and the PSC, has to go through a detailed examination by the PRL [French language, Liberal Reform Party] and the PVV [Flemish language, Party for Liberty and Progress]. It is important also to remember that in such social matters a whole series of royal decrees must be added on to the draft bills in order to

put the measures into concrete form, measures which are painful sometimes, but which do not have to be referred to the legislature.

It is known that the object of the two draft bills, which will complete the austerity package desired by Martens V--in fact initially it was a single draft bill which he had to chop up in the face of a barrage of criticism from parliament against mammoth laws--are: one, restrictions concerning education; the other, everything having to do with social questions, employment and rent control.

Hot Spots

We are told that the definition of the university professor's "total workload" will be the only education problem. A specific problem this time between Christians and Liberals who have differing views on the degree of reorganization tolerable in higher education. Regarding social matters, things seem to be much more complex. Hansenne and Dehaene are watching each other. They link the reform of the Unemployment Compensation system, which is in the former's bailiwick, with that of Health-Disability Insurance which is the preserve of the latter. These are fundamental questions since, especially in regards to unemployment, this means making a drastic break from the existing rules for graduating payments according to family situations. While, for example, the restriction aimed at reinsuring the health-care quota--the decision to impose payment in all circumstances--makes a dent in the interest of mutual insurance companies, who are dear to Dehaene's heart.

What "Deregulation"?

It will be recalled that government intentions relative to what the Christians call "flexibility" and the Liberals call "deregulation" were submitted to the National Labor Board. The latter's opinion should, in principle, be made known today. But nobody has any illusion: according to positions adopted by union on both sides the response would be negative. And according to most it will be accompanied by remarks and amendment proposals.

"It's the government's prerogative," says the Liberals, "to make a decision as to whether it should be included in the final edition of the texts."

But for the Christians things are not so clear-cut. While some agree with the Liberal view, others--especially those close to the CSC [Confederation of Christian Trade Unions]--think it would not be a bad idea to resubmit the draft bill to the National Labor Board after reworking.

The same difficulty exists concerning the position to take regarding reticences--that is a euphemism--which make an interprofessional agreement less probable. Moreover, this is no secret, since Gerard Deprez, president of the PSC, responding to Wilfried Martens in our columns only this week, thought that it would be wrong to practice the policy of government overthrow.

The CVP's Problems

All this illustrates what we pointed out above. The normally suspicious relationship between Christians and Liberals is accompanied by disagreements among Christians, who will in no way allow any tampering with the sequence of events, especially with respect to the arranged schedule.

Moreover, are these disagreements not more aggravated by the characteristic indecision of the CVP, whose leaders have just decided to postpone [until] after the elections the convening of an ideological congress originally planned for March 1985? It should be said, in regard to the CVP, that Mark Eyskens, expressing recently in public what an important fringe of the Party thinks in private--his "confession interview" with BELANG VAN LIMBURG--started quite a ripple of scandal. But why take this initiative, surprising to say the least, (which is being discussed in circles close to Flemish Christian training) to create a kind of circle of reflection and to listen to those people who share the Flemish Christian ideology, but cannot--probably because of political contradictions--really fight in the ranks of the CVP? What should be said also of this postponement of a congress, if not to mention the present leaders' fear of disconcerting the voter, faced with the difficulty of finding a new line of action and perhaps faced with the uncovering of rivalries (personal or of trends) which are likely to topple the leadership of the CVP....

So, beyond the appearances, the beginning of the Martens V government's new session seems rather agitated.

12687

CSO: 3619/2

KIVISTO VOWS TO REMAIN AT SKDL HELM UNTIL SPRING

Weighing Central Finland Governorship

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 20 Sep 84 p 6

[Article: "Kivisto Continues in the SKDL At Least Until Spring"]

[Text] Kalevi Kivisto (People's Democrat), chairman of the Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL), is still in the process of deciding whether to accept the offer of the governorship of Central Finland Province.

On Wednesday, however, Kivisto promised that he would come to a decision quickly. According to Kivisto, the offer of the governorship comes from the government. He said that in any case he would continue as chairman up until the SKDL party congress, which will be held next May.

According to Kivisto, the SKDL party council can, in accordance with regulations, decide on the question of chairman as well. However, the option that he would continue at the SKDL helm until spring is nowhere ruled out.

Kivisto stated that people in the organization have expressed the wish that he continue as SKDL chairman. He emphasized that SKDL has never fallen because of one or two people. In the beginning of March, Jorma Hentila (Communist), long-term secretary general of the SKDL, will become the editor-in-chief of ALKOHOLIPOLITIIKKA magazine.

A solution to the governorship-game is expected in the next few weeks at the latest. Kauko Sipponen (Center), the incumbent governor, is moving on to become the managing director of the Commission on Commerce and Industry (EVA), and has asked to resign his post. He will begin at EVA in the beginning of March.

Kivisto has no pressing reason to immediately become governor, if and when he accepts the position. When President Mauno Koivisto dismissed the Uusimaa Province Governor Kaarlo Pitsinki in 1982, an official from the Ministry of the Interior filled his position for months, until Jacob Soderman (Social Democrat) was nominated for the post.

In any case, Kivisto's probable departure to become governor would make quite a tear in the top of the SKD. The fact that the SKDL chairman has

traditionally been a Socialist, and the general secretary a Communist, will make it even more difficult to fill the gap. In the opinion of Kivisto and Ele Alenius, former chairman of the SKDL, there is no reason to compromise on that principle.

Alenius would have been ready to immediately nominate Ilkka-Christian Bjorklund as his candidate for chairman, "if he were a member of the SKDL." When he left for a position with the Nordic Council, he withdrew from the SKDL.

Kakela to Become General Secretary

The SKDL executive council, which met in Helsinki, proposed to the party council, convening the end of October, that Reijo Kakela (Communist), special researcher for the Ministry of Education, be elected SKDL general secretary to fill the opening left by Hentila.

Kakela's nomination was not put to the vote, although it is known that his rise does not please the taistoite minority, or even all majority members.

The executive council voted 9 to 6 against the proposal that discussion of the question be tabled until the next meeting. The voting outcome did not follow traditional rank divisions. Pauli Puhakka from the minority was the one who proposed the tabling.

The presiding officers of the SKDL who met Tuesday night proposed that the executive council nominate Kakela as a candidate. The presiding officers also suggested that either SKDL managing director Aulis Ruuth (People's Democrat), or electoral chief Antero Hautaniemi (Communist) would assume the duties of the general secretary until the spring party congress. Minority faction Ensio Laine offered Petteri Baer, from the current third faction, who was kicked out of the Communist Party in June, and Seppo Ruotsalainen, for the position.

The SKDL party council's acceptance of the proposal made by the executive council is probably just a formality. Kakela, 41, was elected at the 20th SKP party delegate congress to the Party's Central Committee. At the end of last summer he made the first move, along with representative Terho Pursiainen (Communist) and the SKP political committee member Esko Vainionpaa, towards choosing Arvo Aalto as chairman of SKP.

Kakela acted as Kivisto's political secretary during the latter's term as cabinet minister. He came into the Ministry of Education during Ulf Sundquist's term as cabinet minister in the early 1970s.

In the 1960s Kakela belonged to the SKDL left wing, the so-called "palkane-faction," and even around the time of the SKP extraordinary party congress in 1982 he was supporting the election of Jouko Kajanoja to the SKP chairmanship. Kakela's educational background is a Bachelor's degree in theology.

Reijo Kakela Would Become General Secretary

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 20 Sep 84 p 3

[Article: "Kakela Will Become New General Secretary of SKDL"]

[Text] Reijo Kakela (Communist), a special researcher for the Ministry of Education, will become the new general secretary of the Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL), replacing Jorma Hentila, who is resigning at the end of October.

The proposal for choosing Kakela was made by the SKDL executive council on Wednesday. The proposal will still go to the federal cabinet next month for ratification.

The executive council took a vote on the proposal after a suggestion to postpone the issue until the next session failed 9 to 6.

The SKDL chairman, Kalevi Kivisto (People's Democrat), was a main driving force in choosing Kakela; Kakela had been Kivisto's political secretary during the latter's term as cabinet minister.

Kakela is a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and one of the strongest supporters of Chairman Arvo Aalto.

On Wednesday Kivisto announced that he was still pondering whether to accept the offer of the Central Finland Province governorship. In any case he will continue at the SKDL helm until next spring, when the party congress will mark the end of the term as chairman.

12688

CSO: 3617/231

SPLIT IN COMMUNIST PARTY AFFECTING FATE OF SKDL

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 29 Sep 84 p 2

[Editorial by Bjorn Månsson: "SKDL--Tormented, Disgraced"]

[Text] The difficulties of the Finnish People's Democratic League are discussed by Bjorn Månsson, who writes that Kalevi Kivisto would be leaving behind a political vacuum which it may be impossible to fill. The disgrace of the Finnish People's Democratic League may have double-edged consequences to the entire society.

The Finnish People's Democratic League has celebrated its fortieth anniversary. This provided the Finnish People's Democratic League with a welcome opportunity of looking back at its, at times, proud history. They hardly dare look ahead, for the difficulties have piled up. The 40-year-old party is today tormented and disgraced.

In the course of its 40 years, the Finnish People's Democratic League has seen its parliamentary strength reduced by nearly half, and the setback seems to continue.

When the Finnish People's Democratic League was founded in October of 1944--right after the armistice and the legalization of the communist party--the ambitious purpose was to form a "democratic front" in complete accordance with the theories of Marxism. With the help of, among others, former left-wing Social Democrats, they managed to begin with to maintain the appearance of a fairly broad coalition; on the other hand it was clear, however, that the Communist Party was the leading force.

The same organizational model was then applied, as we know, in several East European countries, e.g. the United Workers' Party in Poland the Socialist Unity Party in the area that became the German Democratic Republic. The main reason why the Finnish People's Democratic League did not make the same gains was, of course, that our country has full internal autonomy. Also other differences render further comparison unfeasible.

With the help, among other things, of the warning words of the then Prime Minister J.K. Paasikivi regarding "new faces," the Finnish People's Democratic League, however, experienced unexpectedly large gains in the parliamentary

election of 1945--23.5 percent of the vote and as many as 49 seats. During the years 1946-48, the Finnish People's Democratic League was at the height of its power, holding, among other posts, the posts of prime minister, minister of justice, minister of interior and minister of defense.

The first major setback, however, occurred already in 1948, when the republic reverted to a so-called more normal political pattern. The number of parliamentary seats was reduced to 38 and then remained for a long time around 40. Exceptions were the more successful elections in 1958 and 1962. However, it was not the Finnish People's Democratic League but the Social Democrats who were responsible for the victory of the Left in 1966.

Since the mid-seventies, the Finnish People's Democratic League has experienced a steady setback. From 40 seats in parliament still in 1975 to 35 seats in 1979 and to the record-low level of 27 in 1983. The Finnish People's Democratic League is thus no longer among the "large" parties but is a medium-sized party--more or less of the same size as the Finnish Rural Party.

The split within the Communist Party, which has given rise to great uncertainty within the electorate of the Finnish People's Democratic League, has been referred to as the major reason for the setback. It is obvious that the open warfare within the largest member organization more or less paralyzed the activity.

However, there are also other reasons for the difficulties of the SKDL. Social developments have not worked exactly in the favor of the SKDL. The rising standard of living and, above all, the gravitational shift within the occupational structure--from working class to middle class--has benefited entirely different parties than the extreme Left.

The inevitable effects of the social development were to coincide with the phenomena of Vennamo and Koivisto. The early seventies saw a shift among voters away from the Finnish People's Democratic League toward the Finnish Rural Party in rural areas, and it now seems that the same trend is now discernable in the urban areas in the eighties. And to the extent that the so-called Koivisto phenomenon has contributed to the political restructuring (as is well-known, the effect has been considerably less than what the Social Democrats had hoped for and others experienced), it is the SKDL which has suffered. If the SKDL has not grown correspondingly, it is due to the fact that it has become drained in other areas.

Also the green wave, in its own way, constitutes a threat to the SKDL. It has, with some success, refuted the Marxist theory that it is the socialists who always represent new ideological ideas in the nonsocialist society. Marxism has revealed its shortcomings when it comes to responding to the so-called new challenges. The SKDL is thus also encountering difficulties in the area of ideology.

In addition, the Finnish People's Democratic League is the party which has suffered the most from the unpolitical trend which for some years has been

felt among pupils in schools as well as university students and which now also appears to affect older people, the so-called intellectuals.

The setback of the SKDL, however, does not apply only to ideological preparedness and formal parliamentary positions. The specific gravity in practical politics has dropped at an even faster rate than would have been assumed on the basis of the purely mathematical decline. A decisive factor, at least on the face of it, was the sudden resignation from government at the turn of the year 1982-83.

It is possible that the majority wing of the Finnish Communist Party--and, in particular, the SKDL socialists, headed by the chairman of the SKDL, Kalevi Kivisto--wanted the period in opposition to be a short one. But then came the heavy election losses, and the split within the Communist Party intensified further, culminating in the party congress in the spring. At present, hardly anybody believes in a come-back of the Finnish People's Democratic League in a government context within the foreseeable future. The most important political position has thus been relinquished.

The debate on the possible government involvement of the Finnish People's Democratic League and the Finnish Communist Party took a somewhat comical turn when a Social Democratic provincial newspaper recently wrote that such an involvement "might even become a foreign policy liability." Those were harsh words, alluding openly to the strained relations between the present leadership of the Communist Party of Finland and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

To this comes, furthermore, that Kalevi Kivisto did not succeed in the objective which he had proposed to himself when elected in 1979: of establishing good, official relations between the SKDL and the Soviet Communist Party.

One would assume that all of these adversities would already amount to more than what a party would be able to withstand at a time. However, on top of it all, a problem now arises within the highest leadership of the SKDL. Jorma Hentila, secretary-general of many years, highly respected outside his own party, has had enough of it and is now going back into a civil service job. His successor, Reijo Kakela is, at least to outsiders, an entirely unknown figure.

A change in the post of party secretary, after all, is a natural phenomenon, but if it is also coupled with the withdrawal from active participation in party politics by the chairman of SKDL after only 5 years in his leadership post, the gaps appear far too difficult to fill. As far as one is able to judge, it certainly is understandable that the, undoubtedly, extremely frustrated Kivisto would find that he has had enough of it and would accept the offered post of provincial governor, but, politically, it creates problems for the Finnish People's Democratic League. Kivisto would be leaving a vacuum behind him which it would be nearly impossible to fill, not least from within the socialist wing of the SKDL.

Undoubtedly, many members of the Finnish Democratic League, therefore, are hoping that the Center Party will succeed in carrying through its continued demand for the post in question. Kalevi Kivisto is probably deemed entirely irreplaceable. With his considerate, undogmatic, and intellectual disposition, he has created respect far beyond the limits of his own party.

The SKDL ought certainly to have other problems to deal with than devoting its time to starting looking for a new leadership future. All opinion polls indicate that the municipal election in 3 weeks will become another loss in the number of lost elections. The party, moreover, enters the election as a split party in several key districts.

If the split within the Communist Party of Finland leads to a definitive rupture of the party, one may wonder what the role of the Finnish People's Democratic League will be in the future. It will conceivably not become a uniting umbrella organization for two competing communist parties. Moreover, Aarne Saarinen's suggestions of a Marxist workers' party between social democracy and dogmatic communism probably will not meet with sympathy within the broader circles of the Communist Party of Finland. What will remain?

The difficulties of the Finnish People's Democratic League are not merely a matter which concerns the extreme Left. There is much to indicate that it would have two-edged consequences for the entire society if, as a result of the disgrace of the SKDL, we were, for example, to experience an even stronger and more dictatorial social democracy.

7262
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PCF CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER CABANES DEFENDS MARCHAIS MOVES

Paris LIBERATION in French 4 Oct 84 p 8

/Portion of comments by Claude Cabanes, member of the French Communist Party central committee and editor in chief of the communist daily L'HUMANITE/

/Text/ More biting things were said at the French Communist Party meeting of 17, 18 and 19 September 1984 than the account published on 22 September in L'HUMANITE would allow one to believe. By way of evidence, take the speech by Claude Cabanes, editor in chief of L'HUMANITE, of which we publish below the first part in its entirety (the second part was devoted to the communist daily). Let us specify that Cabanes is close to Georges Marchais who brought him into the central committee at its 24th congress in 1982.

/Text of speech/

Should we be afraid of ourselves? Should we throw some ballast overboard and be less communist? It is true that we are struggling in the Western part of the universe. Is there in this area a rejectionist phenomenon with regard to us? Is it consequently necessary for us to adapt ourselves, to adopt a lower profile in order to take into account the system of values in which we are embedded? This system does not exist any longer; Western civilization is tottering. It is now only a history book, or rather, the only Western value is money. It has a moral coefficient of zero; it is a nonvalue par excellence. The West does not have anything more to propose and is trying to erase its own history. It does not recognize its own child, humanism, any longer. That is what the Austrian writer Peter Handke noted. We have nothing to gain by hailing and getting into this ambulance.

Very confusedly, people are feeling this final stage. We witness the beginnings of new human relations. We shall have to accompany them, fertilize them, even provoke them. Should we talk of modernity? Modernity is one of these concepts whose secret is held by social democracy. In fact, nothing has changed in the essence of capitalist society since 1981. Something new is proposed to us in appearances, in words, in images. Three years ago Rimbaud was mobilized. It was said that his urging "to change life" was the path to follow. Today it is another Rimbaud slogan that is used: "To be resolutely modern." But this is trendy and nothing else.

We often use the American term "the look." This would refer to our good and bad faces. Should we work at our "look" problem? It is essentially others who produce our image and not us. And then, is our image a major element in our difficulties? In May 1968 did we have an image problem? At the European elections, could an attractive image have convinced the nonvoters that we were not jointly responsible for the bad policy of the government? Robespierre used to say that one should not confuse the forms and principles of action. At any rate, a revolutionary like Robespierre will always look bad, will have a bad image, a bad look because he is a revolutionary. The lags that we have experienced will not be made up by looking pretty after a makeup job. On the theoretical level our lag has been made up. Now we have to do so on the practical plane. This cannot be done by circular, by administrative measures. We shall not write to the federations: "Our cultural revolution begins at 1430 hours." No renovation is possible within a bureaucratic framework. We cannot create something new within the old matrix of the Stalinist spirit.

Democratic centralism has many weaknesses. Its practice has evolved a lot. But it is a cement which provides a structural existence to our revolutionary community.

It is through democratic centralism that we can feel the pressure of our adversary. Some dream of liquidating us over 10 or 20 years and in two ways at that. First, they wish to marginalize our constantly diminishing influence. For that purpose the Socialist Party has available the apparatus of the state and its annexes, particularly the media despite the presence of some more or less communist newsmen on television. Second, they are trying to empty us to our substance, were it drop by drop, to prevent us from being ourselves, to batter our fighting spirit against the wall of privileges which will never be reduced by conviction but rather confrontation. We wish to abolish privileges. If we forget it we shall lose our soul.

Advances in history are not linear. Is our decline mathematical, subject to planning? There are ebbs and flows. History is a long-term process.

2662

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CRITICISM CONTINUES FOR PCF CENTRAL COMMITTEE REPORT

Paris LIBERATION in French 4 Oct 84 p 8

/Article by Eric Dupin/

/Text/ The line of NRPMCLC ("the new majoritarian rally against the crisis") is doing badly. Two weeks after the central committee meeting in September 1984, the PCF /French Communist Party/ leadership is proving to be incapable of dissipating the malaise and questions which large sectors of the party continue to articulate. The accounts of this meeting from the federations have shown that the Georges Marchais report continued to be challenged. Some critics expressed themselves with all the more clarity as the representatives of the executive have often adopted a very hard, not to say provocative, attitude to oblige the reformers to come into the open.

Thus, Paul Laurent, chairman of the committee charged with preparing the draft resolution of the congress, criticized before the activists of the 19th "arrondissement" /district/ of Paris those members of the central committee who approved the Marchais report without being fully in agreement with its text. Furthermore, Paul Laurent indulged in some personal attacks which brought forth a critical majoritarian reaction by that arrondissement's activists. A similar mishap befell Gisele Moreau in Herault Department. She was so critical of the federation committee members of that department where there were numerous reformers that a majority of them walked out of the hall in the middle of the meeting.

In Seine-Saint Denis, the federation committee unanimously voted at the conclusion of a lively discussion for a motion approving the Marchais report, attacking the attitude of the press regarding a debate internal to the PCF, but also supporting Francois Assensi, federation secretary challenged by the executive's supporters. To various degrees, the reformist criticism was also heard in the Alpes Maritimes, Corse du Sud (where a statement very critical of the central committee had been approved by the federation committee), and the Essonne, Gard, Meurthe et Moselle, Pyrenees Orientales, and Haute Vienne Departments. The executive finally heard a number of hardly orthodox suggestions on 26 and 27 September during the communist parliamentary days in Drancy.

This dissatisfaction is targeted first against the weakness of the political orientation defended by the executive. The speech of Claude Cabanes (see below)

before the central committee illustrates to perfection the ostrich policy practiced by the leadership bloc. It reflects a strictly conservative frame of mind which includes revolutionary defeatism and age-old sectarianism. Western civilization is rotten, it will collapse, the editor-in-chief of L'HUMANITE predicted. Accordingly, why strive to adapt to its evolution? Quite the contrary, Cabanes indicated that a revolutionary party such as the PCF could not claim to have a mass influence in such a deteriorating society. In passing, one will have noted the daring parallel which some have strived to strike between the "look" of Georges Marchais and that of Robespierre. Deprived of all strategic perspective, the PCF has been reduced to preserving its apparatus, to protecting its traditional credo from the impact, one day or the next, of the collapse of the capitalist system. In this view, one can easily see that "democratic centralism" constitutes a "cement" which the PCF can in no case do without.

Cabanes' speech shows to what extent the executive takes refuge in the incantation of sacred principles. This leadership gives itself no illusions about a forthcoming electoral upswing. Contrary to appearances, it also places little hope in the surge of a powerful antiausterity social movement that would validate the speech. Its logic is fundamentally of the wait-and-see type. It waits for a Socialist rout, it waits for the ups and downs of the economic crisis, it waits for the decadence of Western civilization.

This orientation, which represents a profound break with the strategy of the unity of the left, inevitably meets opposition. But the leadership would like to avoid the disarray that is affecting the party with the triggering of a new "affair." There is nothing for setting things back like a "Juquin affair" which would give to the reformers the appearance of a "rightist clique" guilty of revisionist tendencies and of indulgence vis-a-vis the Socialists.

Georges Marchais did not hesitate to provoke publicly the nominal spokesman of the politburo on France-Inter television on 26 September. But if the PCF secretary general is looking for a Juquin, he has not found his yet. Juquin continues to be completely silent. On his part, Charles Fiterman, who has strongly urged the reformers to adopt a low profile, has given proof of the greatest discretion. The crisis continues within the PCF. It merely assumes an increasingly passive form.

2662

CSO: 3519/29

POSSIBLE LE PEN-CNI COLLABORATION FOR CANTONAL ELECTIONS

Paris LE FIGARO in French 5 Oct 84 p 10

[Article by Pierre Pellissier]

[Text] At the beginning of a parliamentary budgetary session which promises to be hard on the socialist government, it is no longer even certain that the political future will take into consideration an economic and social situation which certainly cannot be remedied before 1986. Of more immediate concern is the pre-election debate about how to ballot for legislators.

Many things have already been said in anticipation of the National Assembly elections, from the hypothesis of a combination of majority and proportional ballot, to the idea of a totally proportional ballot, whether departmental or regional, and finally, the last few days, to the quite improbable idea of keeping the majority ballot.

There is, however, before the legislative elections, another event that must not be neglected: the cantonal elections in the spring of 1985, a year before the deputies are up for reelection. An interesting election, therefore, even if only half the voters go to the polls.

The socialists have only one solution left to try to limit the damage: a re-districting of the cantons--a kind of butchery they are very good at and which can actually camouflage a general retreat, even though for them the goal goes beyond the cantons. Is it not in fact a question of losing the fewest possible number of general council presidencies?

For the balloting method, on the other hand, no a priori surprises can be predicted: it will be the two-part uninominal majority system--the ideal system for the opposition, but the worst for the majority at the moment.

The opposition still has to reach some agreement. Where the RPR [Rally for the Republic] is well rooted and where the UDF [French Democratic Union] has influential people, there are still some small groups which do not want to be absorbed. And there is evidently some thought being given to the CNI [expansion unknown], which has not ceased to decline since the 1960's, a decline that began with the split which produced the RI [Independent Republicans], direct parent group of the PR [expansion unknown]. There is also the National

Front, to which Europeans have given an importance that bothers the opposition more than it does the majority, even though Jean-Marie Le Pen is establishing some hierarchies among his Marxist enemies and his liberal adversaries.

In this ambience it is logical that the CNR and the National Front should join forces. And it is actually toward an alliance of these two groups that things are proceeding today. Before signing the agreement only a few small problems of preeminence remain to be settled: the past and the weight of certain influential people, compared to the present and a resurgence of a certain rightist tendency.

Basic Cleavage

There is no dispute, then, concerning the balloting method appropriate for spring, 1985, but 1986, on the other hand, will pose other problems. Certainly it is the socialist government which will settle the question and impose its views; certainly the Left is, a priori, in favor of the proportional method in spite of Christian Pierret's warning last Sunday; certainly the RPR and UDF have been in complete agreement on keeping the majority ballot. But then again, there are a few groups, such as the CNR, which has everything to lose with this type of ballot, and of course the National Front.

There is where the basic cleavage among all shades of the liberal clan lies.

To choose the majority ballot means to remain in harmony with the Fifth Republic, with an electoral system which has always favored the emergence of an authentic parliamentary majority, in keeping with the presidential majority.

It is therefore logical for the RPR to adhere to this, if only from fidelity to its ideas and traditions. It is also normal that the UDF cling to it for the very same reasons, even though the sentimental or traditional ties are less strong here. It is also very clear that certain members of the UDF will be reluctant and that the National Front has already refused, because the latter depends on the proportional ballot for its very existence. And if one can actually speak of cleavage, Mr Le Pen, in this case, does not hesitate to justify his choice by the need to change the administration or the constitution.

This will force him in the next few months to emphasize the lack of balance between the executive and legislative branches, with a parliament which is more eclipsed than ever; the role of the Senate, which will have to be revised, giving it, for example, investigatory powers; and the incompatibility he hopes to find between the public administration law and the parliamentary mandate.

Which all comes back to saying that, on the right of the political chess game, the debate will also include how institutions have evolved over the years, especially since 1958 and including developments in 1981, which saw the socialists slip easily into a mold they had heretofore wanted to shatter.

COPEL ON DEFENSE POLICY, CONVENTIONAL, NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 29 Sep 84 pp 22-23-R

[Interview with former French Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff General Copel]

[Text] Until last March, he was the youngest French general, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff. Disagreeing sharply with the military doctrine of his country and of NATO, he published a controversial book and resigned from active service. In Lisbon for the release of the Portuguese edition of "Vencer a Guerra" [To Win the War] Inquerito Publishing House, General Copel explained his positions to EXPRESSO.

[Question] In your book, you say that if the military doctrine and system are not changed, the French president runs the risk of one day confronting a single alternative: to utilize nuclear weapons or capitulate. In other words, the current nuclear deterrent is useless and dangerous because it is at the same time too ambitious and too fragile. What does this mean exactly?

[Answer] There is a single word with which I do not agree in what you have just said, namely, the word "useless." In my view, nuclear deterrence has its use to protect us from a nuclear attack. It is natural for a country that suffers a nuclear attack to respond in kind--and that is why a nuclear attack against a country under those conditions is not reasonable. Here, therefore, the deterrence works and Europe is satisfactorily protected against an attack of that type.

What I do not believe is that the Soviet Union can be deterred from attacking us in classical (or conventional) terms merely by the threat of an American, French or British nuclear response. No democracy will dare to resort to the nuclear weapon first, being attacked merely by conventional weapons. That is why I say that the nuclear weapon defends us against the nuclear weapon but not against the conventional.

[Question] So that, in the case of a Soviet conventional attack, the French president would have to capitulate in order not to unleash a nuclear disaster... But why would he still not respond conventionally?

[Answer] Precisely because our military doctrine is not based on a deterrence of the conventional by the conventional, of the chemical by the chemical but exclusively on our nuclear weapon against the Soviet conventional, chemical and nuclear weapons. Our conventional inferiority relative to the Soviets is such that, in case of an attack, we could only respond with nuclear weapons. And, which is the democracy that would dare to resort to the nuclear weapon first? If it did so, it would be a catastrophe. Thus, the alternative is to capitulate.

'1,000 Afghanistans'

[Question] But if you are going to reinforce the classical and chemical defenses that brings about a raising of the nuclear threshold.

[Answer] It is not a question of raising. What I propose is that France and Europe organize their defenses in such a manner that the Soviets will know that in case of a conventional invasion, we would be capable of organizing 1,000 Afghanistans and make them pay a very high price. In that way, we will be deterring them from provoking an attack of that type.

[Question] Exactly. But, if I am not mistaken, that precisely is called raising the nuclear threshold; that is, reinforcement of conventional defenses makes recourse to the nuclear weapon more improbable, more remote. As you know, there are those who say that the more remote the nuclear threshold, the more probable a conventional conflict becomes.

[Answer] Yes, yes, that is the current French doctrine. But I reply that, in the first place, it is necessary to localize the threat, the principal risk that Europe faces at the present time.

That risk is that of our being invaded by surprise by the Soviets with conventional and chemical weapons. That is not the most serious danger, I admit--that would be the danger of atomic destruction--but the most probable one, since neither the French conventional defense nor that of all of NATO are equal to coping with it in exclusively conventional terms.

That is today's reality. Now, if I propose reinforcing the classical and chemical defense, it seems to me that I am deterring much more, dispelling much more, the danger of a war, even a classical one, than with the artificial theory of nuclear deterrence pure and simple. The latter, in addition to not deterring a classical attack, draws closer the specter of a nuclear conflict in response to a classical attack.

That is why I say that at the present time if the danger of war comes from the East, the danger of nuclear war--or of capitulation--comes from the West.

'No First Use Outside'

[Question] Very well, I believe that the overall diagnosis of the situation has been made and the general sense of your proposition outlined: Europe is not defended at the classical and chemical level and it is necessary to

reinforce those areas, just as the tactical nuclear area, in the prospect of a conventional invasion. Is that right?

[Answer] Right.

[Question] Let us see the proposals, then, sector by sector. In the tactical nuclear sector you propose the introduction of the neutron weapon and the declaration of "No first use outside." Do you want to explain?

[Answer] The neutron weapon is the only nuclear weapon that can be used in a defensive manner. It is the one that can be used in our own territory because it is the only one that kills more enemy soldiers than friendly civilians. Unlike the other nuclear weapons, the neutron weapon is very destructive for whoever is on the surface and very little for whoever is in a valley, for example, even a simple valley. This would permit it to be used against the advancing invading armies while saving the maximum possible number of civilian lives.

[Question] Therefore, you conceive of France resorting defensively to the neutron weapon against an invading army.

[Answer] Yes, even though I would much rather have a total ban on the use of nuclear weapons, including the neutron weapon, as is the case with chemical weapons. Except that with the present control mechanisms, that is not feasible, particularly in closed countries such as the USSR. Therefore, until that is possible, the best mechanism to avoid nuclear use is deterrence. I conceive a use of the neutron weapon, exclusively defensive and in a very localized manner.

[Question] Is that where the "No first use outside" comes in?

[Answer] Exactly. MacNamara and the American Protestant bishops propose that the West solemnly declare the "no first use" of the nuclear weapon. I recognize that, in view of the conventional imbalance in favor of the East, that position could be understood as a defeat in advance. But it is also undeniable that no one has the moral right to unleash first a nuclear conflict of disastrous consequences.

I, therefore, sought an intermediate solution, the "no first use outside." If I am simply defending myself from an outside attack, I have the right to resort to all means in my territory to prevent the aggressor from crushing me: if the enemy does not want to unleash a nuclear escalation, all he has to do is to withdraw from my territory.

The "no first use outside" is, therefore, the commitment not to use the nuclear weapon first on the territory of the adversary. Now, if he invades me...

[Question] If he invades you, you respond with neutron weapons fired only on the enemy troops that invaded your territory...

The Swiss Model

[Answer] Yes, even though I do not completely like that and recognize that it is still an imperfect solution. If we could have a real "no first use," it would be better. If Europe should succeed in organizing a defense as good as Switzerland's that too would already be enough to make the antitank neutron defense unnecessary...

[Question] The Swiss defense, that is already part of your proposals in the classical sphere. Why would an army of reservists of the Swiss type be more effective than the present system?

[Answer] What I propose is that France defend itself as well as Switzerland in order that it can deter the Soviets from invading us, as Switzerland deterred Hitler...

[Question] It is usually said that Hitler did not invade Switzerland because it suited him better to leave it alone...

[Answer] It is usually said, that is right, but it is not true. I knew the German general who was charged with invading Switzerland. They made the calculations and desisted because they saw that it would cost them too much ...in material and in human lives.

[Answer] Fine, fine; it is also usually said, the one who spoke is no longer here...

[Answer] And, after all, why is it that I insist on the model of the Swiss Army of reservists? I will give two examples:

You are in the street in any part of Switzerland and ask some passerby: What do you do if war breaks out? He replies immediately: I go to such and such a place...He knows the name of his leader, of his comrades, of his subordinates; he knows what he has to do, what weapons he is going to use and where he will be. Now, if you ask the same question of a Frenchman, and probably of a Portuguese, he will not know how to answer you.

In the second place--and also contrary to what is said about classical defense, that it would be too expensive--the Swiss model is not at all costly. The Swiss spend twice less per capita than the French. In the meantime, they manage to put on a war footing as large an army as the French despite the fact that they are eight times fewer in number than we in terms of total population. It is true that we have costs which they do not have, the nuclear weapon, for example; but even discounting that, they achieve better results with less money.

[Question] Can you briefly explain why?

[Answer] Essentially because they know what they must do in case of war. The Swiss military service is comprised of a very short training followed

by very short but repeated periods every year throughout one's whole operational life. For years, the people return to the service for a few days and find the same leader, the same comrades and the same mission, and they know what they must do.

Chemical Weapons

[Question] Let us now view the problem of chemical weapons. At the present time there is an international agreement not to use this type of weapon, although in your book you accuse the Soviets of violating it, dropping chemical weapons in Kampuchea and in Afghanistan. Are you not afraid, all the same, that people will accuse you of wanting to promote another arms race, this time also in the chemical area?

[Answer] It is a little like the same problem of a while ago. Look: I do not plan to unleash a chemical war. But there will undoubtedly be a chemical war if the Soviets maintain their superiority. We must arm ourselves in this area to deter them from using the chemical weapon...

[Question] ...

[Answer] You know that the Soviets are not observing the agreements on the nonutilization of chemical weapons, do you not?

[Question] Well, as for knowing, I do not know. They deny it. Now, that there are strong indications; yes, there are.

[Answer] Very well, then, but Hitler who had powerful chemical weapons observed the ban and did not use them in World War II. Why? Because he was more humanitarian than the Russians? Not at all. Because he knew that the allied soldiers and civilians had means of protection against chemical weapons and means of reprisal in kind. That is what is called deterrence --and it works.

Well, at the present time, there are "indications" that the USSR is using chemical weapons on a massive scale and we have our populations totally unprotected against that, besides which we do not have the capability to retaliate in kind. As for the troops, they are beginning to have some means of defense against the chemical weapon but it is still too little. In 1939, we were better defended in that area than now. And the only way for us to defend ourselves is to arrange things so that they cannot hurt us too much and we can hurt them sufficiently in response.

Absolute Evil

[Question] Very well, now let us go to the more general aspects: In your book, you say that the nuclear weapon is the absolute evil and that the possibility of war comes exclusively from the Soviet bloc, if the latter confronts an internal crisis of survival. In that case, I ask if when the French support the Polish Solidarity, or when Mitterrand defends Sakharov publicly, is that not contributing to sharpening the internal contradictions

of the Soviets and, therefore, to drawing closer the danger of war? According to your premises, should we not put an end to ideological confrontations and accept communism as it is?

[Answer] That is a very interesting question...I am not president of the republic but if I were I would really agonize...on the one hand, to help the Poles and fight for the application of the international agreements on human rights; on the other, to know that any destabilization of the Soviet regime increases the danger of war.

But, in time, it is necessary to understand that if we want to stop the arms race, if we want to install serious international control systems, it is necessary for the last totalitarian empire to be transformed. Just as it was necessary for fascism and Nazism to sink to save peace, so too is it necessary for communism to sink...but without having time to "gobble" us up. For that reason, I say that we must organize an effective defense, as far as possible from recourse to the nuclear weapon, but understanding that their system is bad and that we are not prepared to accept it. Furthermore, all dictatorships end up by collapsing; yours collapsed, Franco's did, etc...the Soviet one too will end up by collapsing.

[Question] Underlying that is that the danger of unleashing a war comes exclusively from the East. Why?

[Answer] Because it is a totalitarian system, a dictatorship, which will not hesitate to resort to violent means to insure the survival of its regime.

[Question] And can a democracy not do the same?

[Answer] No, because there is the weight of public opinion, the pluralism of the organs of power, the parties.

[Question] And the United States? Ronald Reagan seems quite inflexible...

[Answer] Reagan is quite offensive in his words but, even if he wanted to, he absolutely could not unleash war against the USSR. There is a senate elected regularly; nobody has absolute power; there is not even the shadow of a dictatorship.

Better Red Than Dead

[Question] But, returning to the original reasoning, let us see: if the greatest danger is that of a conventional conflict unleashed in the East, degenerating into a nuclear war as a response from the West, why not support the unilateral nuclear disarmament of the West?

[Answer] Because in that case a nuclear imbalance would be created favorable to the Soviets, which would not restrain them from unleashing an attack or nuclear blackmail against Europe.

[Question] Pardon me, blackmail is not an attack. If the nuclear weapon is the absolute danger, and the only...

[Answer] Yes, it is the only absolute one because it brings about the destruction of the planet.

[Answer] Then, better red than dead. If on the other hand, the East can unleash a conventional attack but not a nuclear one, the best defense against the absolute evil is unilateral nuclear disarmament.

[Answer] Hold on, you are taking logical leaps...Better red than dead? Yes, in the final analysis, because I cannot fight when I am dead and I can still do so when red. But rather than that, neither red nor dead. If the East cannot attack us now with the nuclear weapon it is because we are defending our territory and are deterring them from attacking us. That nuclear defense is legitimate.

[Question] If the nuclear weapon is the only absolute evil, the only absolutely legitimate attitude seems to be the destruction of nuclear weapons.

[Answer] Of course, but in order for that to happen let them put an end to their dictatorships and give us guarantees that they do what they say instead of saying what they do not do. We cannot forget the problems of the regimes: either democracy or dictatorship.

[Question] Then you admit that if you do not introduce that other premise, you cannot succeed in legitimizing the very concept of nuclear deterrence at the same time that you declare that the nuclear weapon is the absolute evil--which, in turn, is absolutely reasonable.

[Answer] Of course, that is why the problem of pacifism is not as simple as it sometimes seems. In any case, I believe that the greatest problem we face today is that, with the current European defense doctrines, we are creating a situation in which recourse to the nuclear weapon may come hypothetically from the democracies. Either the nuclear weapon or capitulation.

The Resignation

[Question] You published this book and resigned from the armed forces. Could you not have done it and remained in your position?

[Answer] According to the French laws, I could have. A military man can espouse in public, opinions different from the official positions in the military area provided that he does not reveal security secrets. Only the political area is forbidden to us, which I consider good.

[Question] Then, why did you resign? At 46 years of age, you were the youngest French general.

[Answer] Theoretically, I could have not resigned. But in practice it was not possible. My difference regarding the French defense doctrine is profound

and total. I believe deeply in democracy and know how to observe and apply decisions with which I do not agree but which are legitimate. That without doubt is the present case. But can I hold a high military position and say in public that I disagree sharply with what I am doing every day? People would say: it is impossible for him to fulfill his role well. And I myself would doubt that.

Because I believe deeply in the conclusions at which I arrived, I decided to write this book and retire.

[Question] And are you going to fight for them?

[Answer] Without a doubt. My book is being translated a little all over Europe, and just as now happens in Portugal, the publishers invite me to promote interviews. I do so with great pleasure and I trust in the capacity of public opinion in a democracy to exert influence.

8711

CSO: 3542/7

BRIEFS

NEW CALEDONIA LIBERATION MOVEMENT--Speaking in Strasbourg, Jacques Baumel, RPR [expansion unknown] deputy for Hauts-de-Seine, demanded: "How can the French Government accept without any reaction the installation at Moumea of an alleged liberation government of New Caledonia composed of "independentists" who openly preach the violent boycott of the next elections there and demand that the French leave, as well as the secession of New Caledonia, with the active and obvious support of a foreign government which supports terrorism and subversion throughout the world?" Jacques Baumel asks whether these extremely serious events do not fall under the law forbidding any attack on state security and national unity. [Text] [Paris LE FIGARO in French 5 Oct 84 p 10] 8735

DELEBARRE RISING POLITICAL FIGURE--Michel Delebarre is unquestionably a man on the way up the political ladder of the Mitterrand administration. He had already been noticed by the president of the republic while he headed Pierre Mauroy's staff at Matignon, and everyone at the Elysee Palace knew that he would survive the departure of his mentor. He will probably receive other promotions between now and the end of the current administration. One of Francois Mitterrand's close collaborators said of him, "He reminds me of a Beregovoy, who has taken the time to read Proust." [Text] [Paris LE FIGARO in French 5 Oct 84 p 10] 8735

MARCHAIS POLITICAL STRATEGY--To gain a reprieve of several months, Georges Marchais has surrendered himself entirely to those who most actively opposed his strategy for a united Left. And to make this about-face succeed, Marchais did not hesitate to make demands on Pierre Juquin and several of his most faithful lieutenants. Thus he gained a respite until the congress in February. Whether the party's run of bad luck sweeps him away or not, Marchais will nevertheless have to run the gauntlet. Plissonnier will not deal gently with him for long if he wins, and should the contrary occur, partisans of the alliance with the PS [Socialist Party] won't be handing him any more presents. [Text] [Paris LE FIGARO in French 5 Oct 84 p 10] 8735

CSO: 3519/30

NEW ELECTORAL LAW EXPECTED FOR FEBRUARY 1985

Athens TA NEA in Greek 17 Sep 84 pp 1, 11

[Excerpts] The new electoral law will be introduced in the Chamber of Deputies in February. The government will give the parties the possibility to express their views in time on the system under which they wish the elections to be conducted.

The government is already studying certain systems for the purpose of selecting the one to be proposed to the Chamber of Deputies.

The D'Hondt system is the one that the government is considering primarily. Whether it will be the final choice of the government will depend on the proposals that the working group of experts from the ministry of Interior will submit. Under this system there would be only one distribution of seats per district.

Another electoral system under study by the government is the one (the Papanastasiou system) which provides for the proportional distribution of the 200 seats to all the parties (which obtain a minimum number of votes) and the distribution of the remaining 100 seats between the first two parties.

In any event, no matter what system is chosen, the overriding elements in the government's decision on the final choice will be:

First: It would have to be a simple proportional system as has already been announced by the premier;

Second: The emergence of a strong government must be ensured by the ballots, but there must also be a proportional representation of all the parties (those which have obtained a minimum number of votes). This was emphasized in the premier's press conference at the Zappeion.

Third: It must be an equitable system that will be different from those used by the governments of the Right.

If the D'Hondt system is ultimately selected, the distribution of the seats in an electoral constituency, which has five seats available, will take place as follows:

The party that obtains 120,000 votes, for example, will secure three seats;

The party that subsequently obtains 90,000 votes will obtain one seat;

The third party, which perhaps obtains 60,000 votes, will secure one seat.

In any event, in the large constituencies that have a large number of seats available, the small parties will have the possibility of securing a seat.

With the introduction of the electoral bill in the Chamber of Deputies a basic matter held in abeyance in the political arena is going to be eliminated:

1. The government keeps its promise;

2. It offers the parties the possibility of preparing themselves to seek the popular decision (as was emphasized yesterday by the government's spokesman, Mr. Maroudas).

It is an important fact that this time margin is given to the parties so they will know "under what system the elections are going to be held."

Mr. Maroudas pointed out in his statement that "The government, by choosing early February as the time to introduce the bill on elections, implements its proclaimed plan for the timely introduction and voting of the new electoral law, about 9 months before the next elections are to be held."

At the same time, Mr. Maroudas reiterated Mr. A. Papandreou's statement that the elections will take place in October 1985.

9731

CSO: 3521/5

CHANGES IN PASOK INFRASTRUCTURE, PERSONALITIES

Athens TA NEA in Greek 18 Sep 84 p 22

[Text] Broad changes were made in the leadership committees of PASOK by the movement's Executive Bureau, which yesterday made public the names of the new secretaries and the alternate secretaries of the 18 committees.

Ten new secretaries, all of them long-time movement officials, were appointed, while an aggregate of 38 new individuals, out of a total of 65, were appointed to the committee secretariats. At the same time, many officials were transferred to other committees. These alternate secretaries were "promoted" to secretaries (G. Papandreou, from alternate organizational secretary to secretary of interpretation); (Th. Papageorgiou, earlier alternate secretary for Youth, to secretary, and Lila Khristoforidou, from alternate secretary for Culture, to secretary of the same committee). Two were "demoted" (R. Spyropoulos, from secretary of Labor Unions to alternate secretary and Elpida Praxiadou, from secretary on Women's Affairs, to alternate secretary of the Equality Committee, as the Committee on Women's Affairs was renamed).

Other changes that took place:

The Committee on Emigrant Greeks was completely changed.

Deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Miltiadis Papaioannou, becomes secretary of the Self-government and Local Problems Committee; the minister of Merchant Marine, Mr. Giorgos Katsifaras, becomes alternate secretary of the Economic Committee; deputy, Mrs. Sylva Akrita, becomes alternate secretary of the Committee of Peace and Human Rights replacing deputy Sakis Peponis; former minister, Mr. Giannis Pottakis, is appointed alternate secretary of the Foreign Relations Committee (alternate minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Karolos Papoulias, remains as secretary of that committee); the secretary general for Sports, Mr. Kimon Koulouris, was reappointed to his position as secretary of the Rallies Committee, while the secretary general of the ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, Mr. Andonis Papathanasopoulos, went from secretary of the Committee on Self-government to secretary of the Committee on Unions of Professional Artists.

It must also be noted that:

The governor of the Bank of Agriculture, Mr. Vasilis Kafiris, was appointed secretary to the Committee on Equality--as the Committee on Women's Affairs was renamed.

The Press Bureau of PASOK was upgraded to Committee on Press and the Bureau of Legal Protection was merged with the Committee on Solidarity.

On the other hand, it is expected that within a few days there will be announced the appointment of the present secretary for Youth, Mr. Stefanos Manikas, to the position of the new Committee on Liaison between Government and Movement.

The names of the secretaries and alternate secretaries are as follows (the names of the previous secretaries are in parentheses):

1. Organization: secretary, Dim. Sotirlis (Khr. Papoutsis); alternate secretaries: N. Mikhaliopoulos, P. Oikonomou, G. Khatzopoulos.
2. Interpretation: secretary, G. Papandreou (Vasso Papandreou); alternate secretaries: Men. Ngivalos, Mikh. Koutouzis, Gian. Papadatos.
3. Economics: secretary, K. Geitonas (same); alternate secretaries: G. Katsifaras, G. Mbirdimiris.
4. International Relations: secretary, K. Papoulias (same); alternate secretaries: G. Kranidiotis, V. Konstandineas, G. Mantzouranis, G. Pottakis.
5. Solidarity and Financial Protection: secretary, P. Lambrou (I. Koutsodimitris); alternate secretaries: T. Mandelis, I. Matrangas.
6. Emigrant Greeks: secretary, G. Xarlis (M. Papastourou); alternate secretaries: G. Mbetsios, Ar. Ouzinidis, K. Tsimas.
7. EATOP [Self-government and Local Problems]: secretary, M. Papaioannou (A. Papathanasopoulos); alternate secretaries: Th. Kapetanakis, D. Reppas, Th. Stathis.
8. Youth: secretary, Th. Papageorgiou (St. Manikas); alternate secretaries: G. Mangriotis, G. Nikolaou, Khr. Smyrlis.
9. Culture: secretary, L. Khristoforidou (M. Khatzinakis); alternate secretary: G. Voulgarakis.
10. Sports: secretary, G. Papaioiannakis (same); alternate secretaries: G. Kasimatopoulos, G. Katsimbardis.
11. Equality: secretary, V. Kafiris (E. Praxiadou); alternate secretaries: M. Avgoustianakis, E. Kapazoglou, E. Praxiadou.
12. Trade Unions: secretary, G. Souladakis (R. Spyropoulos); alternate secretaries: D. Kitsioudis, G. Ravtopoulos, R. Spyropoulos.
13. Agricultural Trade Unions: secretary, G. Mbristogiannis (same); alternate secretaries: M. Gavalas, G. Perrakis, D. Khristodoulou.

14. Professional, Commercial, Artisans (EVE): secretary, G. Kyriopoulos (same); alternate secretaries: L. Lymberakis, V. Mytilinaios, M. Stavrakakis.
15. Trade Unions of Scientists and Artists (ESEK): secretary, And. Papathanasopoulos (K. Sfingos); alternate secretaries: G. Koulaxis, An. Seretis, K. Tzinieris.
16. Peace and Human Rights: secretary, Mikh. Doris (same); alternate secretaries: Sylva Akrita, Eirini Lambraki, Al. Rosios.
17. Press: secretary, G. Tsalakos (same); alternate secretary: P. Trogadis.
18. Rallies and Demonstrations: secretary, K. Koulouris (T. Giambouranis); alternate secretary: G. Panagiotakopoulos.

9731

CSO: 3521/5

SECURITY CORPS' TABLES OF REORGANIZATION DISCLOSED

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 12 Sep 84 p 7

[Text] Four sections of the new law on the unification of the Security Corps, which was passed yesterday by the Chamber of Deputies, are of particular interest for the structure of the new Greek Police.

In essence:

The horizontal and vertical restructuring of the entire hierarchy of the Public Order Ministry;

The redistribution of the police forces in the country and especially in the Attiki basin, in Salonica and the remaining large cities;


The quantitative change in the ratio of operational and administrative services;

The new disposition of the operational and administrative services with a substantial increase in the number of policemen serving in operational units and the decrease in numbers of those who serve in administrative units.

At present the Public Order Ministry's hierarchy, the organization of the commands of the Cities Police and the Gendarmerie and their remaining structure of operational and administrative services are divided into six levels.

This structure not only does not help, but in many instances it has actually been abolished. The bill that was passed condenses these six levels into three, aiming at a rational disposition of the hierarchy, but mainly at better control of the lower echelons by the higher ones.

According to the new law, the ministry would be the highest authority, followed by the police directorates and then by the branches of public order, security and traffic controls. (Graph 1)




Graph 1. Hierarchical Level of Services

Key:

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Present | 7. Gendarmerie Station, Police Station or Special Services Station |
| 2. Ministry of Public Order | 8. Proposed |
| 3. General Headquarters | 9. Ministry of Public Order |
| 4. Police Directorate or Gendarmerie Higher Headquarters | 10. Police Headquarters |
| 5. Police Sub-directorate or Gendarmerie Headquarters | 11. Police Precinct; Traffic Precinct (Athens); Security Precinct (Salonica) |
| 6. Police Precinct or Special Services Precinct | |

Big Cities

The second part comprises the redistribution of the police forces mainly in Attiki, Salonica and the other large cities. Until now there was a tremendous overstaffing of the administrative service. There are at present 5,488 men in the administrative services alone, a percentage of 14.3, while under the unification only 650 men will serve in them, a percentage of 1.68. As a result, the forces saved will be transferred to the operational services. A similar situation exists in Attiki, Salonica and nationwide. In Attiki, for instance, after the unification there will be 16,700 men in service instead of the present 14,051, in Salonica, 4,000 instead of 2,991, and in the rest of the country, 17,250 instead of 15,830 serving at present. (Graph 2)



Graph 2. Table of Forces Distribution by Region

Key:

- | | |
|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. Proposed | 6. Administrative Staff |
| 2. Present Organization Strength | 7. Attiki |
| 3. Strength | 8. Salonica |
| 4. Total strength | 9. Remaining Country |
| 5. Ratio | 10. Ratio of Police to Inhabitants |


Operational and Administrative

The third significant point that changes the present disposition of the police forces is the ratio of the operational forces to the administrative services. At this point, it must be stated that the present staffs of the administration of the police services were always out of proportion to the operational ones.

Precisely the opposite is achieved under the new law. For instance, the ratio of the personnel presently working in administrative services is 1 administrative to 4.53 operational, a percentage of 18.06. The new law, on the other hand, provides for 1 administrative position for every 40 operational ones. At the same time, there will be a change in the ratio of the operational services to the administrative ones. At present, one administrative service is equivalent to 7.33 operational ones, while the new law provides one administrative one to 51 operational ones. (Graph 3)

3

Σχέση μαχιμών-επιτελικών



Graph 3. Ratio of Operational to Administrative Personnel

Key:

1. Present 1 Administrative to 4.53 Operational
2. Strength
3. 1 Administrative to 7.33 Operational
4. Services
5. a. Operational; b. Administrative; c. Services; d. Strength; e. Average Strength
6. Proposed 1 Administrative to 40 Operational
7. Strength
8. 1 Administrative to 51 Operational
9. Services
10. a. Operational; b. Administrative; c. Services; d. Strength; e. Average Strength
11. Administrative
12. Operational

The fourth, and surely the most substantial point that the new law improves, is the force provided to staff the new operational and administrative services. While, until now, the administrative ones were overstaffed, the law that was enacted gives precedence to the operational ones that actually prevent and fight crime. At present, out of a total of 2,016 services, 242 are administrative, with a strength of 6,739 men, and 1,774 are operational, with a strength of 30,575 men. The new law provides for only 631 services--operational and administrative--broken down into 12 administrative ones, with a strength of 934 men, and 619 operational ones, with a strength of 37,666 men. (Graph 4)

ΣΥΝΟΛΑ ΔΥΝΑΜΕΩΝ ΜΑΧΙΜΩΝ-ΕΠΙΤΕΛΙΚΩΝ ΥΠΗΡΕΣΙΩΝ				
(1) Διακρίβη	(2) Υπηρεσίες		(3) Δύναμη	
	(6) Σύνολο	(7) Ποσοστό%	(8) Σύνολο	(9) Ποσοστό%
	(5) Επιτελικές	(10) Μαχιμές	(11) Σύνολο	(12) Σύνολο
(4) Σήμερα	242	12,00	6.739	18,06
(13) Μαχιμές	1774	88,00	30.575	81,94
(14) Σύνολο	2016	100,00	37.314	100,00

(12) Διακρίβη	(13) Υπηρεσίες		(14) Δύναμη	
	(16) Σύνολο	(17) Ποσοστό%	(18) Σύνολο	(19) Ποσοστό%
	(20) Επιτελικές	(21) Μαχιμές	(22) Σύνολο	(23) Σύνολο
(15) Προτάβη	12	2,42	934	02,00
(24) Μαχιμές	619	97,58	37.666	98,00
(25) Σύνολο	631	100,00	38.600	100,00

Graph 4. Totals of Operational-Administrative Services Strengths

Key:

1. Type	8. Total	15. Proposed	22. Totals
2. Services	9. Percentage	16. Total	
3. Strength	10. Operational	17. Percentage	
4. Present	11. Totals	18. Total	
5. Administrative	12. Type	19. Percentage	
6. Total	13. Services	20. Administrative	
7. Percentage	14. Strength	21. Operational	

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CS0: 3521/5

BRIEFS

PAPOULIAS VISIT TO ETHIOPIA--Alternate Minister of Foreign Affairs Karolos Papoulias is preparing to visit Ethiopia on a state visit that has twice been postponed. Mr Papoulias has made the "great decision" to travel to the country of Mengistu Haile Mariam (with whom he will have a lengthy meeting) and take the opportunity to discuss matters of mutual relations regarding the Greeks residing there. The visit (if there is no other postponement) has been set for the latter part of October. [Text] [Athens TO VIMA in Greek 16 Sep 84 p 2] 9731

CSO: 3521/5

BRIEFS

ANGOLAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S DISMISSAL--Angolan Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge was dismissed from his post, and the official decree mentioned last night by the Angolan National Radio indicated that the dismissal was effected "for service reasons." The news of the dismissal followed information according to which the Angolan minister was envisioning the cancellation of his planned official visit to Lisbon in the beginning of 1985 or the downgrading of its results. This information was obtained by the newspaper CORREIO DO MINHO from African diplomatic circles in the Portuguese capital; however, Portuguese Foreign Minister Jaime Gama chose, as late as yesterday, not to comment on the issue, while a Portuguese diplomatic source stated that the talks for the meeting between the two foreign ministers were "well on the way." [Excerpts] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 22 Oct 84 p 1]

TELEPHONE CALLER IMPERSONATES EANES--The president of the republic, Gen Ramalho Eanes, complained to the Judiciary Police through the office of the attorney general of the republic that false telephone calls were made in his name to convoke a number of officials to meetings in Belem, the ANOP [PORTUGUESE NEWS AGENCY] reported. Imitating the voice of General Eanes, the caller "invited" to these meetings Marshal Costa Gomes, former Minister Goncalves Pereira, the prime minister's spokesman, Carneiro Jacinto and Gen Galvao de Melo. The caller, who has reportedly already been identified, can be sentenced to 2 years' imprisonment and a fine of 100 days [as printed] for his action, which is defined as "usurpation of functions" by the Penal Code. [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 18 Oct 84 p 15]

CSO: 3542/30

POLITICAL DEBATE SURROUNDS REPLACING OF HOME GUARD CHIEF

Sogaard Stepping Down

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 28 Sep 84-4 Oct 84 p 3

[Article by Hans J. Poulsen]

[Text] At the age of 60, former Defense Minister Poul Sogaard has decided to slow down. He will remain in parliament, but he is leaving his post as civilian commissioner of the Home Guard. According to Defense Minister Hans Engell, the government has no plans to abolish this top position. It is believed that the post will be filled by a person with a background in politics.

During the last cabinet meeting of the Anker Jorgensen government at Marienborg on 7 September 2 years ago, one of the participants fell unconscious and was taken immediately for observations at the hospital in Gentofte.

The victim of this serious indisposition was then Defense Minister Poul Sogaard, who had just spent several exhausting days with a series of weekend meetings following a trip to the United States.

Sogaard recovered quickly, but there was no doubt that his illness was a symptom of stress, that tense physical and psychological condition that is familiar not only to top decision-makers in business, but also to politicians.

After considering the situation in detail and discussing it with family counselors over the summer, Poul Sogaard, member of parliament and civilian commissioner of the Home Guard, has decided to slow down. He stressed that this decision had no political overtones or undertones, but was based entirely on the interests of his family and his constituents. Ten years before he was required to do so, he gave up his position as commissioner, effective on 1 January 1985, a position he has held since 1972, with the exception of his years as a cabinet minister from 1977 to 1982 when he was on leave.

Poul Sogaard is third in seniority in parliament after Erik Ninn-Hansen and Erhard Jakobsen. "When I finish my career, it will be in the political arena," said Poul Sogaard, who has been in parliament since 1959. During the past week,

many have asked him why he did not do the opposite: leave his political work and remain in the Home Guard. The former railroad worker is actually doing the latter, but only as a private in Railway Company 4005 in Odense, where he has been enlisted for 25 years.

Popular Conscience Of Home Guard

The position of civilian commissioner with the status of Home Guard chief is something unique that is unknown elsewhere in the Danish military, where only the officers are in command.

Paragraph 4 of the Home Guard Law states that the Home Guard leadership will consist of the Home Guard chief (a major general with pay scale 39) and the commissioner (a civil servant with pay scale 38).

Poul Sogaard, 60 years old, believes that the civil division of the Home Guard is "irreplaceable" and refuses to listen to those who believe the position of civilian commissioner should be abolished when he steps down: "We are part of the popular conscience of the Home Guard. We will teach young people the attitude that has created and driven the Home Guard. This is particularly important now, since 30 percent of the new Home Guard recruits are under 30 years old. In addition, we in the civilian division are responsible for educational and informative tasks. These are carried out primarily by our 12 Home Guard advisers. We also fulfil administrative functions, including appointments."

The Home Guard Law states that the top military chief, the general, and the commissioner must agree in their decisions. Otherwise, the matter is referred to the cabinet minister. Poul Sogaard cannot recall a matter related to the Home Guard going that far.

Earmarked For Politician?

The Home Guard in Denmark is a true child of the resistance movement during World War II. It was hardly a coincidence that a member of the Freedom Council and liberation government, member of parliament Frode Jakobsen, became the first civilian commissioner in 1948. But this might have occurred, in addition, because when Hans Hedtoft formed the government in 1947 he passed over his fellow party member in favor of diplomat Gustav Rasmussen, whom he "inherited" from Knud Kristensen. In any event, Frode Jakobsen, on many occasions, has been called the foreign minister Denmark never had. When this controversial figure stepped down from the Home Guard at the end of 1971, the position was given once again to a Social Democratic politician, the loyal party soldier Poul Sogaard who, at that time, was the party's speaker on defense issues. When he assumed office, he stated:

"I believe it is important that this post continue to be occupied by a politician, rather than a civil servant. The civilian commissioner should be in close contact with local authorities, politicians, and organizations. Continuous lobbying in parliament is needed in order to gain the necessary

political backing. The latest indication of this was in connection with the defense compromise.

Engell: Position Not Abolished

Defense Minister Hans Engell (Christian People's Party) has stated that the government has no plans to take this opportunity to abolish Sogaard's position. When asked if the position would be filled once again by a politician, Engell said: "There are good arguments in favor of appointing someone with a background in politics and close political contacts. A political sense and insight is important, but there is no written law that it must be an active politician in parliament. We will take a close look at the applicants once the applications are all in.

Kjeld Olesen Seeks Post

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 8 Oct 84 p 8

[Article by Solveig Rodsgaard]

[Text] Kjeld Olesen is still a candidate for the position of Home Guard commissioner, even though the government believes that the position should no longer be occupied by a Social Democrat.

Although powerful forces within the government are working to prevent a Social Democrat from assuming the position of Home Guard commissioner, former Foreign Minister and Defense Minister Kjeld Olesen continues to seek the position. Kjeld Olesen says that many people, including Home Guard members, have encouraged him to seek the position.

After it became known that Kjell Olesen was a candidate for the top position in the Home Guard, which will become vacant when former Defense Minister Poul Sogaard steps down at the end of the year, many circles within the government and the coalition parties have been worried, especially since Kjeld Olesen and Social Democratic chairman Anker Jorgensen and Lasse Budtz have been active in creating the new security policy, which is unacceptable to the government.

In addition, many nonsocialist politicians oppose the idea of having another Social Democrat in this important position. CD (Center-Democratic Party) political leader Erhard Jacobsen said yesterday in BERLINGSKE SONDRAG that the coalition parties would find a nonsocialist candidate. He said he opposed the tradition of filling the position with a Social Democrat who was on his way out of politics. The CD candidate for the position is the chairman of the party's parliamentary group, Frode Nor Christensen.

Breadth In Home Guard

Kjeld Olesen responded in BERLINGSKE TIDENDE that, when Erhard Jacobsen proposes a CD candidate, he must remember that the CD represents only 3 percent

of the votes, according to a Gallup survey.

"I would like to make clear that, whatever the circumstances, I will seek the position. This is not because of the salary, since I have only modest material needs. I am seeking the position because I believe it is important for the Home Guard to have sufficient breadth. In addition, since my father actually built up the Home Guard, I feel it is part of my legacy."

"Is this the main reason you are seeking the position?" we asked.

"No. The main reason is quite simply that I believe the Home Guard is an important part of our Danish defense and I believe it should be as representative as possible. It is up to others to decide whether or not I can provide such breadth. It is not true that the new leader must be a Social Democrat, but the Social Democrats are, after all, the largest party. Since many people are now speaking of the need for breadth in the Danish defense system, I have decided to seek the position. Many people, including members of the Home Guard, have told me that I 'must' apply."

We asked Olesen: "Do you understand the government position that the post should not automatically go to a Social Democrat, that a nonsocialist should now be appointed?"

"Yes, but I believe it is important for the Home Guard to maintain sufficient breadth and, since I have been encouraged by so many people, I have decided to apply for the position."

Security Policy

"Many members of the government and of the coalition parties believe you have been one of the toughest opponents of the government's security policy. What do you say to this?" we asked.

"I would say that they are confusing the situation. Because of my childhood and the things I have experienced, I have always believed that we must have a defense system. We have differed in the past, although the prime minister's opening speech seems to indicate that we no longer differ, on the madness of the nuclear arms buildup. I have always believed that we must defend Denmark."

"Do you believe it will cause problems for you if the Social Democrats present a security policy proposal similar to the resolution on nuclear weapons adopted by your party congress?" Olesen was asked.

"No, because these ideas were already presented in our proposal of 3 May. The important question is what we should work for. This question is related to the NATO strategy and we are not proposing any unilateral Danish measures. Nor will we do so if we present a new security policy proposal."

The post of Home Guard commissioner has been occupied by Social Democrats since it was established in 1948. Kjeld Olesen's father, Home Guard adviser Anker Karmark Olesen, was mentioned as a possible commissioner at that time, but the position went to Frode Jakobsen, instead. He remained at this post until 1972 when Poul Sogaard took over. When Poul Sogaard was defense minister from 1977 to 1982, the position was filled by Knud Damgaard.

Guard Speeding Materiel Procurements

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 8 Oct 84 p 6

[Article: "Accelerating Materiel to Home Guard"]

[Text] With the new defense agreement, the Home Guard can continue its present level of activities, according to the defense minister.

Material Procurements for the Home Guard will now be accelerated, since the new defense resolution has provided the Home Guard with an additional 30 million kroner annually.

This was stated yesterday by Defense Minister Hans Engell (Conservative Party) when he spoke to leaders of the Danish Women's Voluntary Army Corps in Nymindegab.

To Receive Field Radios

"Thus, beginning in 1986, the Home Guard will receive a significant number of field radios, as well as NATO observational equipment. We will also begin to replace the protective masks used by the Home Guard. Beginning in 1985 to 1986 we plan to provide the Home Guard with protective uniforms against chemical weapons," the defense minister said.

Hans Engell added that the new defense resolution would make it possible to maintain the present level of activity, although efficiency measures will still be necessary.

Bonus Effect

"The extended period of compulsory military training that will also result from the resolution will have an added bonus effect on the Home Guard. If we draft more recruits and lengthen their period of training, recruits for the Home Guard will be better trained, so that the Home Guard can provide less training itself. This is not without significance in the areas of financing and training," the defense minister said.

The minister also told the chief of the Women's Voluntary Army Corps that he was waiting for a response from the Home Guard leadership in connection with the most recent killing with a Home Guard weapon. He said that the Defense Ministry was also considering measures to improve safety.

Paper Against Automatic SDP Appointment

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 9 Oct 84 p 8

[Editorial: "Is He the Right One?"]

[Text] The former foreign minister and, perhaps more important, the former defense minister, Kjeld Olesen, has announced that he is applying for the position of commissioner of the Home Guard, even before the position has been advertised as vacant. He makes no attempt to hide the value of his supposed qualifications and indicates that it is to his advantage that his father, as an adviser, helped build up the Home Guard. Some of his fellow party members add that it is a matter of course that the position will be given to a Social Democrat--as if that were the only party that could provide this branch of the service with the suitable breadth and popular support. It will not be that easy for the Social Democrats, however, nor should it be.

The first commissioner of the Home Guard was then member of parliament Frode Jakobsen who, in his memoirs, described the problems that can result from the appointment of a politician. First of all, the government at that time, which was Social Democratic, saw it as a prerequisite for his appointment that Frode Jakobsen would leave parliament. Secondly, Defense Minister Rasmus Hansen told him that, as commissioner, he could not support NATO and, since the appointment was made during the heat of debate over Denmark's security policy, it would be difficult for a politician to meet this requirement. Frode Jakobsen did not want to give up his active political career. He also wanted to work for his country's affiliation with the Atlantic Pact. He refused to accommodate the other members of his party, who finally had to accept the fact that the commissioner was also a politician and involved in the country's foreign policy.

The same question has come up again in connection with the upcoming appointment of a new commissioner. It is especially important, since the Social Democrats have chosen to conduct a foreign policy for the past 2 years that differs from the policy that has enjoyed broad support ever since the time when the government that included Rasmus Hansen led our country into NATO. Can Kjeld Olesen be the commissioner if he, as a member of parliament, is working for a policy that conflicts with the position inherent in our NATO membership? Can he be commissioner if he leaves parliament? Would it not be both unfortunate and wrong for the government--with its direct responsibility for security policy--to let him represent that government as leader of the civilian section of the Home Guard, considering the security policy line he and his fellow party members have followed? Seen from the outside, such an appointment could be perceived as yet another concession to a Social Democratic opposition that wants to put pressure on the government. It could be seen as a confirmation that the coalition parties do not treat these matters with sufficient seriousness.

It is possible that Kjeld Olesen may be the most qualified applicant. In that case, he should be appointed. But the misgivings his party had many years ago should be considered when the decision is made as to whether he is the right one. This is not a position Kjeld Olesen should receive simply as a matter of course.

AIR FORCE CHIEF DEFINES BRANCH'S TECHNOLOGIES, NEEDS

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Sep 84 pp 46-56

[Article by Gen Eberhard Eimler, Air Force chief of staff: "The Role of Our Air Combat Forces in NATO: The Task of the Air Force Within the Context of Flexible Response"]

[Text] On 26 June 1984 at the forum held by the German Defense Technology Society under the title "Air Weaponry Within the Framework of the Alliance" Maj Gen Eberhard Eimler, chief of staff of the German Air Force, was one of the speakers.

He discussed particularly at that forum the task of the Air Force within the context of the joint NATO strategy of flexible response. He first discussed relations between the Air Force and the German aeronautical and astronautical industry, which, he said, is affected by three limiting factors. One factor is a progressive slowing up of the transition from one generation of weaponry to the next; the second factor is the tightness of funds for research and development and the third is the multiplicity of the requisitions. With regard to the employment of new technologies the chief of staff urged that priority be given to a gradual rise in production quantities for the larger weapons systems as opposed to an attempt to completely exhaust the technologically possible improvement in the performance of individual systems. Moreover: ground-to-ground missiles can supplement manned systems but cannot entirely replace them. He declared that the contest with hostile air combat forces is a prime task for the future and he called for more firepower for this contest.

He urged also the maintenance of a balanced ratio between strength on the battlefield and combat in depth. With regard to the present discussion of strategy Maj Gen Eimler was of the opinion that it would be necessary to depend more heavily upon conventional forces, without, however, planning for a conventional defense of long duration. He asserted that basically all planning studies reduce to the task of optimizing the relations between immediate reaction and the duration of combat.

Within the Ministry of Defense it is the part of the chief of staff to think and act like a supply officer. It must be his prime interest to obtain efficient equipment promptly without incurring risks and at an economical price. The level of efficiency cannot be an arbitrary choice: experience has shown that it must be gauged by prognoses of what the enemy can achieve up to a point midway in the operational life of the system--in other words during the next 15 years.

The performance catalogue is to be based upon the structure of a combat unit. It is a question of determining whether a system can be managed over the long term with the available personnel, the planned infrastructure and with the existing logistic and command system.

Dealing With Risk During Planning

Such considerations do not aim only at defining the "right" system. They are also an essential part of the handling of risk during planning. A further element of this is the second demand which is imposed upon a supply officer, namely prompt introduction of new equipment. It would be more exact to speak of "short startup times." This is as much as to say that every long-term commitment--for example, on the basis of a national system development--constrains the flexibility of the planner and shifts risks to the responsibility of the supply officer.

The planner must work in opposition to this situation but at the very same time he must allow for an additional demand: the situation requires that system procurements be disentangled. This is necessary because our planning system is based upon budgetary law and in practice knows neither investment peaks nor valleys. Funds are distributed uniformly over the years. As a result of this circumstance the Air Force, for example, distributes the planning of its weapons systems for air defense over more than 15 years: by the end of the eighties, PATRIOT and ROLAND; by the middle of the nineties the "90" pursuit plane and around the year 2000 a new medium antiaircraft rocket system. Here the supply officer is drawing up a bill on the future. The necessarily associated risks he must nevertheless strive to confine. For this reason, for example, in the case of the pursuit plane he is interested in strict control of its configuration and of all cost-determining factors. International competition also belongs in this picture. And it might be marginally noted here that international competition is effective only if it is possible to make purchases in significant quantity abroad.

One must continuously find satisfactory compromises to deal with these conflicting requirements. It is entirely natural that the Air Force should protect its degrees of freedom as much as possible. But it does not therefore keep aloof from those departments of the ministry which meet its needs and certainly does not keep aloof from German industry.

Using the Expertise of Industry

On the contrary, the command staff of the Air Force is very anxious to use the expertise of industry--an expertise which can come only from industry's in

important armament programs. It is also apparent to me that in the long run the Air Force can obtain the product which it wants only if the German aeronautical and astronautical industry is suitably consulted in meeting armament needs. It is equally true that the Air Force can make its demands credible only if the Air Force itself is prepared to take into account promptly arms-economic viewpoints and the viewpoints of European politics and labor market policy. In addition, it must recognize the need to support technology.

I wish to emphasize that we do not find this burdensome. We can point to a long and successful cooperation with the German aeronautical and astronautical industry which promises to continue to be successful in the future. Certainly it is true that there are many products of this cooperation which we could have wished to be cheaper and to have been made available for use by the troops earlier and in a more fully developed form. But in terms of a realistic judgment and on the basis of international comparisons it must, however, be recognized that the Air Force has on the whole been well served by our national industry. It is evident that the Air Force can increasingly expect to obtain competent engineering solutions even to very difficult problems. Basically I see only a few, certainly important, factors which set limits to cooperation between the Air Force and industry:

i. Slower transitions between equipment generations:

First: system changeovers from generation to generation are slowing down while technical progress is accelerating. This presents our planning with a very difficult field of tensions. This context includes questions relating to programs for the maintenance of combatworthiness, questions having to do with operational life cycle costs, the shift of performance capability from the weapons carrier to the weapon and quite especially questions regarding the role of electronics, where the emphasis is on software. The decisive point here has to do with the controlling function exercised by the armament needs of my combat unit. This need will no longer suffice to guarantee a continuous system sequence in development and production nor will it suffice even to stimulate the latter. Whatever consequences may be drawn from these facts one thing is certain, they have a very material effect upon the Air Force even though they relate primarily to arms-economic and political questions outside the defense area. For this reason the Air Force will always participate in any discussion of the role and development of the German aeronautical and astronautical industry.

ii. Limited R&D funds:

Secondly: budget funds available for research and development are as limited as those available for procurement. What I have said above about the relationship between the Air Force and German industry bears primarily upon development projects--but it is not my intention thereby to undervalue the mass production process and commercial success. The importance of industry and in particular its importance for meeting our specific needs arises primarily from its ability to create new and novel products. Of course, the more this ability is exploited the greater is the need for development funds. This is illustrated by the case of the "90" pursuit plane but it also applies to the entire planning process.

The solution certainly does not lie in a restratification of procurement funds in favor of development; procurement funds are specifically designed to meet minimal requirements. One way out would be to rely more on purchases of ready-made equipment: but this would lose those very advantages which I have mentioned above, but the needs of the Air Force could still be met in that way. In other words, on the basis of the "originator principle" the Air Force could arrange to have an only partial involvement in and commitment to development projects.

In other words, the Air Force does not have any funds which are freely at its disposal and is not the primary source of the problem. Therefore, with development funds being in this situation, a somewhat overreaching solution must be found if the preservation of our defense capability is also to rely upon a close cooperation between the Air Force and industry.

iii. The multiplicity of requisitions:

Thirdly: German industry is not large enough to be able to promptly meet all the requisitions of the Air Force. And this continues to be the case even if one includes international cooperation; the latter is concentrated primarily upon areas which are assigned, in the jargon of planners, to the so-called periphery. By the latter we understand equipment for reconnaissance, guidance, logistics and training--in other words, for functions which primarily make possible the operative use of the weapons systems. While we find excellent equipment of this type also in German industry nevertheless the augmentation and rounding out of this equipment into a balanced potential can be accomplished only through purchases abroad. In part the same thing is true of weaponry and also of weapons systems. Thus in order to meet our urgent need for improvement in airspace protection by means of antiaircraft rocket systems there is practically no other alternative to the Raytheon Company in the United States. The issue of competition to which we have only briefly referred above and also the need to meet specifically central European defense requirements make a long-term European option appear to be very desirable in this situation.

The three factors which have been mentioned--slow transition from one equipment generation to another, limited development funds and the multiplicity of requisitions--make a rational cooperation between the Air Force and industry also desirable in the future but it would be unrealistic to disregard their effects and to commit the Air Force to function increasingly as guarantor of armament-industrial development.

The Air Force and Technology

Armament within the alliance as a national responsibility: under this heading it is also useful to illuminate the relationship between the Air Force and technology because perhaps never before have discussions in the alliance been so much motivated by the possibilities and limitations of technology. Here I expressly include discussions of strategy. The use of technology by the Air Force is based to a large extent upon experience. It may be objected that experience is no protection against misjudgments and folly; in particular cases

it can even interfere with one's perception of possibilities. But experience is the indispensable basis of achievable solutions and of prudent reserve in dealing with technological progress. Here "reserve" is to be equated with "limitation of risk"; at the same time it promotes the economic use of funds.

Nevertheless, the German Air Force is a very highly technologized combat arm. In view of the threat and in view of our obligations to the alliance a general dependence upon simplistic and cheap systems is out of the question. Also, we could not require our soldiers to fight with inferior systems in a combat situation. Apart from certain logical expedients for the simpler problems, the Air Force therefore remains committed over the long term to high-technology systems and the uninterrupted use of (an assured) technological progress.

The Structural Mastery of New Technology

Here there is an essential requirement which must always be met and which I have already mentioned: new technology must be in harmony with the structural capabilities of the Air Force and the Air Force personnel must be capable of handling it. This must first of all allow for the fact that any point of departure must be based upon the current state of affairs--no planning sets out today from zero. For example, the logistical system must always support a heterogeneous fleet of old and new combat aircraft; it cannot be oriented fundamentally relative to the conditions of the more modern generation of weapons systems. Infrastructure is a problem--it almost always is a limiting factor. Frequently that is also the case for command apparatus and command systems.

The problem of personnel adequacy is today viewed mainly as a problem relating to the diminishing strengths of our annual troop enrollments and is thus seen largely as a quantitative problem. But it is also a qualitative problem because the annual troop enrollments must be more intensively employed while at the same time our choices become fewer. The Air Force has some experience with the qualitative aspect of technological mastery on the part of the soldiers. Here I am thinking of the sacrificial introduction of the F-104G STAR-FIGHTER which I myself experienced at close range. The so-called STARFIGHTER crisis was based essentially, but certainly not entirely, on a deficit in training in all areas which were important for the reliable mastery of the system. The experience gained then continues to be present and relevant and in principle may be applied to the whole armament area. It is an important part of my responsibility as chief of staff to use this experience and to strive to provide Air Force units with equipment which our soldiers can use.

The Relation of Quantity to Quality

The task of finding a proper measure in our dealings with technological progress does not, however, only represent the need to limit the risks of planning or the need to bring new equipment into harmony with the structural capabilities of the Air Force. There must also be proper proportion in scaling the ratio of quantity to quality consistently with the existing threat. The Air Force is being challenged to break a trend that has been maintained for over two decades. The Air Force--for good reasons--has increased quality at the cost of quantity. Concretely: in this period of time our inventory of combat aircraft has dropped to half of its initial size.

Now a limit has been reached here which compels us to another setting of priorities. It is no longer possible for the qualitative advantage in our air combat forces to compensate for their quantitative deficiencies. That is, first of all, a consequence of the improvement in quality among the air forces of the Warsaw Pact nations. But it must be kept in mind that the preservation of a real advance in quality requires disproportionate expenditures. The engineer knows well that the last percent of increase in combatworthiness is always the most expensive.

Priority for Larger Quantities of Equipment

The second reason why we must rethink priorities lies in the recognition of the fact that in conventional forces the ratio of numbers must not exceed a certain limit. This has to do with a number of factors which for several years have been under investigation intensively using Operations Research. Essentially it is a question of the ratio of combat success to losses. This is a ratio which depends particularly upon one's ability to concentrate one's forces in conjunction with the ability to react swiftly and in conjunction with fighting intensity. It may be demonstrated that to this end one requires a high standard of performance on the part of command systems, reconnaissance facilities and weapons systems. However, preference must be given to a gradual increase in the rate of production of equipment as opposed to fully exhausting the technological possibilities inherent in an individual system. The Air Force is trying, for example, to transform this principle into reality in the case of the "90" pursuit plane. Of course, we can have only a sketchy notion of design reference points if we are projecting the weapons system into the prospective world of the years 1995 and 2010. In making such a projection one cannot use the standard pursuit plane of 1985 as a scale of comparison. The same may be said of the medium antiaircraft rocket system to be provided for the end of the nineties.

The Use of Technologies Which Economize on Personnel

The Air Force has checked to see whether the reversal of the trend toward increasing inventories of equipment has been structurally implemented. On the basis of our current state of knowledge it is possible to accomplish this reversal particularly by using technology which economizes on personnel. Voices have been raised now for a long time urging such economy but results up until now have been only partly encouraging. But if one takes all possibilities into consideration--guidance, operation, maintenance, and repair on the one hand and on the other hand an appropriate adaptation of the peacetime operations of combat units to changed conditions--if, in other words, one consolidates all of this into a single design then it becomes possible using the expected supply of personnel in the eighties and nineties to operate a greater range of armament than would be possible today. The Air Force has a ready proof of this: the most outstanding example--and in no sense a unique one--is the changeover from NIKE to PATRIOT and ROLAND. In operating the latter the Air Force will be relying only on the personnel inventory of today's antiaircraft rocket troops. In place of the 24 NIKE units the Air Force will be operating 36 PATRIOT attack batteries and 95 ROLAND weapons installations using the same personnel as before.

It must be allowed that this is in part a consequence of our dispensing with a nuclear component in air defense. But this dispensation had been planned for a long time and is part of the policy which was established in the alliance with respect to the continued development of its nuclear potential. The saving in personnel for a PATRIOT battery in comparison with a NIKE firing unit ranges far beyond the saving of security personnel and is in fact a prototype for future armament. PATRIOT shows how today in some areas it is already possible to have a drastic reduction in personnel costs accompanied by a simultaneous great increase in fighting power. The aim of again raising the inventory figures for the principal weapons system meets an essential demand expressed by the European Supreme Command of NATO. Of course, it is true that in the present planning situation this is concentrated upon air defense--first of all in the introduction of PATRIOT and ROLAND and in the introduction after 1995 of the "90" pursuit plane in the operatively necessary numbers.

"Emerging Technologies"

The relationship of the Air Force to technology is not two-tracked. The Air Force's use of technology is linked to a practical purpose. Mere concern for the future of technology would be a poorer basis for this link than simple realism which is motivated by the hard calculations of planning and by the needs of the troops. I make this observation as a preface to a short discussion which I think recent armament initiatives within the alliance merit. I consider it to be characteristic that these initiatives have come about under the heading of "emerging technologies." In German there is probably no definitive translation of this term. It refers to technological developments which in the view of proponents are already well under way and could be used with special advantage for defense.

I prefer to start conceptually by asking what it is that we must plan for our intended operations guidance, for our concerted strategy and for deterrents. This yields a framework both for the search after new technology and also for its actual use in supplementing and further developing our already existing potential. It is precisely this latter point--the supplementation and further development of the already existing--which has not been taken into account in all their discussions by the proponents of "emerging technologies." The Air Force planner cannot allow himself to become involved in any ahistoric planning formula. He must make the best possible use of already undertaken investments. Once they have been initiated he must bring projects to a logical conclusion. For him a fundamental reconfiguration is possible at the earliest in the course of the nineties--in other words over the long term and in no case over an intermediate term. And I know of no parliament which would assent to replanning over the intermediate term if this would entail the neglect of previous investments and the institution of new and additional ones. This critical view of realities could also be well applied to other items, for example, to the availability of already developed systems ripe for mass production: here financing possibilities are often overestimated.

Manned and Unmanned Systems

In connection with the "emerging technologies" discussions the Air Force is repeatedly confronted by the demand that it replace its manned systems with unmanned systems, in other words with drones and ballistic or nonballistic missiles. The claim is also made that the unmanned systems are more effective and cheaper. The Air Force has for a long time made use of missiles and rocket systems:

Our air defense is based inherently on antiaircraft rocket systems. This facility is being further expanded through the German-American PATRIOT/ROLAND agreement.

For nuclear forces we are operating the PERSHING 1 A. Aircraft weaponry consists to a large extent of missiles and this fraction is increasing. Basically there remain two areas which today we have not yet dealt with by means of missile systems:

i. Reconnaissance: The systems which may be achieved for this purpose in the visible future are drones, for the most part for reconnaissance of the hostile battlefield. For the Air Force they would only represent a specialized way of dealing with a task which over the long term has already been dealt with using existing or planned reconnaissance facilities. Also, part of our reconnaissance facilities is also provided for weapons engagement--a task which could not be accomplished by reconnaissance drones. Nevertheless, for the nineties the Air Force is looking for supplements which can be logically meshed into the system of its reconnaissance facilities; drones, too, are being considered for this purpose.

ii. Ground-to-ground use with conventional systems: In procurement planning the system being primarily considered in this connection is the so-called "small-drone antiradar." It would be used to hold down the hostile antiaircraft defense and thus cost-effectively increase the success of our combat aircraft. Although such a system cannot be cheap nevertheless it can still be simple since its task must meet comparatively elementary requirements. The ratio of cost to utility changes rapidly with increasing range and as demands for effectiveness at the target are increased. If one adds to this operations against moving targets then additional measures are needed for target reconnaissance which are not employed in the case of manned combat aircraft.

Ground-to-Ground Missiles--A Supplement

In this connection the Ministry of Defense has sponsored studies which come to a unanimous conclusion: ground-to-ground missiles are a logical economical option in place of manned aircraft only when extremely high loss rates are to be expected. Here "extremely high" means "far above the values which have been encountered in previous armed conflicts--calculated over the entire duration of the war.

The last investigation of this matter was carried out at the behest of NATO with data provided by the American side and also by industry. Results of the

investigation thus far have fully confirmed the earlier investigations--at the present time there is no logical purely conventional missile option against the air and land combat forces operating in depth. This applies not only to the course of development and procurement; it also applies when one takes into account personnel requirements and operating costs.

It was probably the recognition of these facts that caused recently publicized missile projects to be abandoned--which was not very difficult to do since they were only rough ideas on paper.

It is my conjecture that the question of conventional missile systems will quickly lose importance, and especially in the discussion of strategy. In another swing of the pendulum it can again enter the foreground later on--it is our hope that in the interim solid analytical work will have been done and that technological progress will have opened up more promising prospects.

The Air Force has a natural interest in exploiting useful developments in this domain. In particular, in combat against the air forces of the Warsaw Pact countries it would be important to achieve rapid success through destruction or crippling of their airfields. Missiles over the long term can prove themselves to be a useful device; they would contribute to limiting the losses of the manned combat aircraft during initial operations. The effectiveness of the hostile air defense system would be greatest in the early operations and hence produce comparatively high losses.

Here I have described a supplementation function which seems to the Air Force to be logical and valuable. But the planning situation and the development of our defense potential will not change fundamentally. This means that in the future forces and facilities will continue to remain in tight supply. A restricted context always increases the importance of flexible combat equipment and especially of that equipment which is suited for the concentration of forces but the relative value of specialized facilities diminishes. This continues to be the primary reason why the Air Force over the long term must essentially rely upon manned combat aircraft. Only these possess the operational capabilities which a defender needs to repel a quantitatively superior attacker.

Technological Progress

Technological progress is perceived by the general public and also by specialists as proceeding at a furious pace. To many laymen and to a number of experts this progress appears to be unrestrained and threatening. This even leads to hostility to every technological innovation. Skepticism toward the many concurrent and often technically based armament projects is part of the problem with which we come into direct contact when dealing with the public and with political committees. It is difficult to obtain an adequate consensus that the threat must be our standard of reference and that the development of the threat compels us to continuing efforts.

The Extent of Technological Development Can Be Estimated

We would be greatly aided if industry and others who are interested in defense technology would present armament with greater clarity and consistency and hence also more credibly within the context of defense efforts. In so doing it would be useful to explain the concrete effects of technological development. Using air combat forces as an example it may be shown that effectiveness has increased in an evolutionary manner--in firepower, in target accuracy, in bad weather operational capability, in range versus useful load ratio, in penetration capability and in survivability and in guidance and reconnaissance. There have been no abrupt jumps in armament development and there are none in prospect. Technology has been translated step by step into visible Air Force armament.

I consider this to be an especially important point: it is by and large possible to survey the course of development in general terms and--even though it may not be exactly calculable nevertheless it can be estimated with sufficient reliability. In our experience this can even be done for 15 years ahead.

The idea so often discussed in the politics of armament control that technological development automatically spurs on the armament spiral can hardly be sustained from the point of view of air combat forces.

I have introduced this aspect of the matter because armament control primarily aims at establishing stable strategic conditions--in other words at the prevention of war. The strategy of deterrents aims at the same goal by other paths. But clear visibility and tangibleness of future development are also important prerequisites for deterrents. In strategic discussions it is often only the visibility of defense efforts which is mentioned--where the hypothesis is that visible defense efforts must suffice to confront a potential aggressor with too high a risk for his use of military force.

The Continued Development of Conventional Forces

Attitudes toward technological progress, questions of strategic stability and the effectiveness of deterrents are not issues which descend upon us like lightning out of a blue sky. They are also the continuous preoccupation of the Air Force Command. Concretely stated this means rethinking the role of air combat forces in the total defense picture. In so doing we also contribute to the discussion of strategy within our society and in the alliance. It is primarily with the continued development of conventional forces in the NATO triad that the Air Force must come to terms because it is in the area of conventional operations that the Air Force finds its central problems. After the replacement of the conventionally armed and nuclear NIKE system by purely conventional PATRIOT fire units the emphasis will be displaced still further in this direction.

Design of the Air Force

The long preliminary developmental times for new weapons systems in our air combat forces and their generation transitions after what is currently more

than 20 years of operational service necessitate a conceptual approach which is capable of planning over a period beyond the year 2000. If to this one adds the fact that the Air Force as an autonomous combat unit has been in existence for no more than about 50 years then it appears desirable that a new conceptual approach should be developed on the basis of the whole history of our air combat forces.

The air combat forces owe their origin to modern technology. The conditions under which it was militarily useful and the new operational possibilities which opened up led to the establishment of special organizations each having its own command system, a pronounced infrastructure and logistics. This situation is the fruit of two distinct guiding ideas.

One of these ideas may be seen in the development of the American Army Air Corps into the Army Air Force and then into the U.S. Air Force. The evolution of the American Air Force has been primarily determined by the need to employ manned airplanes. These complex high-performance systems can be kept in readiness and can be made fully effective only with the aid of specially trained personnel and with the facilities for command and support which are familiar to us today in a modern air force.

The Role of the Air Force: Integrated Air War

The old and the new German Air Force became more encompassing. Here the guiding idea was to combine as much as possible the entire air war potential organizationally. The new Air Force has deviated from this idea only when the need for immediate protection, special support tasks or commitment to specific areas and operations placed some constraints on that primary idea. To this extent facilities for air warfare may also be found outside the Air Force.

Thus the role of my combat forces has been traditionally characterized by a type of thinking which conceives of air war as an integrated whole.

As early as 1926 the principles governing the use of air combat forces had already been largely developed. This is a historic fact which is seldom mentioned. The ideas prevailing at that time were published in so-called "Guidelines for the Conduct of Operational Air War." Hence it was possible for the first German Air Force in 1935 to avail itself of a ready-made program--LDv 16, "The Conduct of Air War (L.F.)." There is an interesting preliminary remark in this program to the effect that the paragraph entitled "Attack" also contains principles for warfare within the larger framework. According to this preliminary remark these principles "represent first of all recommendations which call for thorough examination by the individual soldiers. They are principles which have been deliberately shaped to fit a large reference frame and with a view toward air warfare as it may come to be in the future."

Although not expressly stated in words, the principles which were most far-reaching in their development were evidently those which today we would assign to "tactical air operations." "Tactical" is occasionally used interchangeably with "for support purposes." But today's limitation to "tactical operations" only asserts that no conventional means have been assigned to the allied forces

which permit a strategic offensive against what the above program calls "power sources" of the enemy. Thus the manner in which the allied air combat forces are assigned to tactical operational goals is not different from the manner in which our land and sea combat forces are assigned to tactical operational goals.

Comparison with the "NATO Tactical Air Doctrine" worked up in the beginning of the seventies makes clear the agreement which exists among the basic concepts of the twenties, the thirties and the seventies. Evidently the air combat forces have gained in fighting power and their image has changed but their tasks and the spectrum of their goals might in principle have been stated in their present form as far back as 50 years ago.

The conceptual task continues to be unchanged, namely the task of adapting the application of the principles to new developments--to the prospective development of the threat and to one's estimate of technological possibilities, all fitted into the planning situation.

1980: Defining a New Role for the Air Force

The last time that the Air Force defined its contribution to overall defense was in 1980. This was the basic portion of a revision of the long-term planning goals which had previously been established in the "weaponry design" and in a study entitled "Air War Facilities for the Nineties."

The ideas prevalent in 1980 started out from the probable operational concept of the Warsaw Pact countries. Without overstretching the bow it may be said that in this role definition the principles of 1926 and 1935 and also the principles of the NATO tactical air doctrine in the seventies have been verified.

The Primary Task: Fighting Against Air Combat Forces

In that role definition the task demanding the most intense study was warfare against air combat forces. Because in the conventional area the air war potential of the Warsaw Pact countries has displayed since the seventies the most rapid and deeply penetrating development. With respect to technology, guidance and training these Warsaw Pact forces are carrying out a transformation from national air defense and army support into an air power in massed operation over a wide area. In the first days of a war it would be necessary to reckon with an offensive involving 12,000 operations per day against goals on the battlefield and ranging in depth as far as the channel coast.

These operations would primarily be directed against the planned execution of mobilization and deployment, against the entrance of reinforcements from overseas, against national and allied command installations and certainly also against the allied air war potential. Such direct action against the activation and strengthening of connected frontline defense along national borders would have to result in an early crisis in NATO defenses in central Europe. Attack on our air combat forces sharpens such a risk because it would direct itself against those very forces which first and foremost would be required in the recovery of the initiative.

This heightens the importance of the conduct of operations against the air combat forces of the Warsaw Pact nations. The planned strengthening of our air defense is a necessary prerequisite to operational success--and also to guaranteeing the survival of our own fliers in the beginning of a war. But the achievement of a breakthrough in the battle for air superiority requires initiative in offense and also that offensives be continuous. This requirement has first place in air warfare doctrine. It is also the core of that American concept which originated in 1982 called "Counterair 90." All the fighting planes of the Air Force are able to contribute to fighting initiated against air combat forces. With the TORNADO and its modern weapons we shall over a long period of time be capable of applying an excellent system having good prospects of success even in warfare against bases.

More Firepower for the Battle Against Ground Combat Forces

For the battle against ground combat forces on the battlefield the most important element is higher firepower. With the improved capabilities of the new armament systems and their weaponry the air combat forces can make a major contribution to this increase of firepower. This will be especially necessary wherever at the outset the continuity of frontline defense becomes critical or wherever in the subsequent course of a war there is a threat of breakthrough. At focal points of defense and of counterattack the decision will depend upon whether the allied air combat forces can apply a firepower which is higher than that of the air combat forces of the Warsaw Pact.

An Old Problem: Battle Deep Within the Combat Zone

For some time now discussions of the best way to conduct warfare against ground combat forces have been dominated by the demand for operations in depth in the combat area. This demand may also be found in the conceptual studies conducted by the European supreme commander of NATO; he has developed the idea as commander of the "U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command." The key phrase is "air-land battle." For the air combat forces battle deep within the combat space and thus the locking up of ground combat forces constitutes an old problem. This problem also came especially to the fore in those 1980 role definitions to which we have previously referred. "Locking up" was at that time--as also in the more recent discussions--looked upon as a direct active response to the operational concept of the Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Pact must depend heavily upon echelon organization: only with a sustained offensive continuing night and day could it achieve its far-ranging operational goals. For this its ground combat forces need repeated replenishment. There is no need here to take up the debate as to whether such an operation would involve second echelons, reserves or operational maneuvering groups (OMG); the principle would remain the same.

If the Warsaw Pact could march its second echelons unhindered up to the battlefield and there deploy them then it would have achieved three-quarters of its operational plan and have substantially enhanced its chances of success. It would then be able to accomplish concentrations of forces capable of decisive breakthroughs. The defender could hardly react appropriately--except perhaps with a supremely powerful emergency assemblage of its air combat forces.

Even supposing that the conventional forces would in the general opinion barely suffice today and in the visible future to contain a ground offensive by the Warsaw Pact nevertheless it is still not correct to speak of the problem as "either strength on the battlefield or fighting in depth." On the contrary both of these must always be striven for in a balanced proportion. The key to the matter lies in seeing the functional relation between battlefield and the in-depth area and this relation should be exploited in accordance with the particular situation.

Basically the interdiction mass applied from the air would be used closer to the battlefield rather than at the start of deployment routes far to the east. Only in this way would it be possible to achieve the required direct effect. In parallel to this, operations deeper in the combat area--for example, against command posts and communications facilities--can promptly defeat the operational purposes of the enemy. Above all, the ground combat forces of the Warsaw Pact can be forced to loosen up everywhere and to shift air defense forces also to the rear for immediate protection.

The Enemy Must Protect Himself From Our Air Combat Forces

With its existing and planned reconnaissance and weapons systems the Air Force can carry out effective interdiction operations. In particular, with the TOR-NADO operational capability "round the clock" can be attained under practically all weather conditions and its modern weaponry increases firepower. This air threat which is multiplied by the corresponding capabilities of the other allied air combat forces must be taken into account by the Warsaw Pact in its operational planning as a decisive factor from the very outset. "Fighting in depth" means here to hinder the enemy in the planned conduct of his offensive. It is at the same time warfare against two-thirds of his ground combat forces. This compels him to adopt preventive measures to protect his forces and these measures in turn reduce their offensive capability. This idea of counterpotential, of "war before the war" must be included in discussions of the "battlefield or field in depth" question.

The Task of Optimizing

The basis of our thinking continues to be the agreed strategy of flexible response. It may not be abandoned before some new strategy has been agreed upon. Taking this as our starting point the only question existing for us would be that of seasonable application of the alliance's strategy--its so-called implementability.

The unanimous reply to this question is to rely more heavily upon conventional forces and to avoid dependence upon premature nuclear escalation. In my view this idea is certainly right but it is not easy to visualize concretely. On the one hand for the future it would also not be an acceptable option for the FRG to plan a conventional defense lasting for a long period of time--this would imperil what was being defended just as much as would a premature escalation. On the other hand it would certainly be unrealistic to urge a defense based upon the blitzkrieg model. This would not be credible as a deterrent because it would have to concentrate too many forces to prevent the attacker

from having initial successes. Deterrence comes about only when one's combat forces are recognizably ready both to spring at once to defense with high fighting intensity and also ready to secure the entrance of reinforcements from overseas. In addition to fighting intensity, the duration of fighting becomes relevant--that is, the ability to carry out conventional operations over an adequate period of time, for it is only this which would make it possible to summon up the entire potential of NATO. This potential is to a large extent dislocated away from central Europe and in the most unfavorable case it would be necessary also, after the outbreak of hostilities, to bring it in over the Atlantic and over the channel. Alliance planning and exercises place emphasis upon this reinforcement. Gen Haig, too, has consistently urged this view.

It appears to me to be important that our efforts toward a higher presence of combat forces in central Europe should not impair the use of reinforcements. In such a case the allied defense planning would risk winning a battle and losing the campaign. There are two issues involved which have not changed and which continue to be decisive:

- i. The combat forces of the Warsaw Pact are designed for a space-seizing offensive reaching to the channel coast. Historically, politically and militarily anything less would be hardly logical from the Soviet point of view. For us it is important to keep this prospect in mind during our defense planning.
- ii. The alliance does not have the option in Europe of a purely conventional defense. In this century it is no longer possible--if indeed it were ever desirable. It would not be possible to get enough personnel--future annual call-ups will not suffice--nor is there evident any readiness for the massive increase in defense expenditures which would then be necessary. This means that the ending of the war would depend upon premeditated escalation; but we cannot allow this to be necessitated by a situation in which NATO is unable to employ its full conventional potential.

Basically, it is a question of optimizing the relation between immediate reaction and the duration of fighting. I am myself not altogether sure that this question is everywhere evaluated in the same way. In any case it appears frequently that insufficient attention is given during the discussions to the interrelationships involved here. Basically, the strength of our presence in central Europe can be maintained and improved only in cooperative effort with our allies. A fair division of the burden would then surely demand a greater German contribution to the support of outside reinforcements.

The role of the air combat forces and especially of the Air Force is decisively defined by such considerations. The optimization of reaction capability and endurance in our defense planning aims at minimizing risks but it cannot entirely exclude them. Air combat forces are the potential with which the residual risk in the event of a surprise aggression can be most easily dealt with. Air combat forces more rapidly than any other forces can switch over from reaction to initiative and strike telling blows against the enemy when his ground combat forces are operating successfully.

A special aspect of this matter is air defense. It must repulse the first air offensive but can hardly be resupplemented by reinforcements.

Therefore the Air Force will direct its planning in such a way that it participates substantially in all operational undertakings in central Europe but at the same time strengthens its share in air defense. This emphasis expresses the fact that the Air Force designs its contribution to the alliance over the long term with an eye toward cooperation with the allied forces. At the same time it contributes to meeting the risk of surprise without limiting the duration of its fighting capability.

The Air Force can be visibly and credibly adapted to developments in the remaining eighties and in the nineties to come only if there is a systematic renovation of its equipment.

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CSO: 3620/449

SERIOUS DEFICIENCIES CITED IN MILITARY MEDICAL SERVICE

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 5 Oct 84 p 2

[Text] Bonn, 4 Oct--The military representative of the Bundestag has used the latest debate of the parliament on an annual report that he prepared to issue an urgent warning to improve the medical service of the Bundeswehr drastically, to move quickly to eliminate its obvious serious deficiencies, and to make sure that it no longer simply performs its task more often poorly than well, as has been the case heretofore. In the concluding Bundestag debate on the annual report of the military representative for the year 1983, Berkhan spoke of grave problems that are afflicting him regarding the medical care of the soldiers, problems that exist even in peacetime. Berkhan pointed out that there are still too few long-term medical officers and that physicians drafted for basic military service--who are university graduates with no practical experience--are not in a position to fill these gaps, especially since they are also poorly trained in the Bundeswehr.

The deficiencies that he is referring to, said Berkhan, did not come into existence in 1983 but go back to the time of the establishment of the Bundeswehr. He demanded that it at least be possible to induct a sufficiently large number of those performing basic military service, that is, young physicians drafted for their compulsory military service, so that the need for unit medical officers can at least be covered numerically. The military representative referred to a division that was short 9 of 31 unit medical officers, and to battalions without their own physician. The military representative criticized Defence Minister Woerner by saying that he can not go along with the minister's resigned answer that attempts in each month to induct a number of medical officers that is precisely determined in advance had not been successful. "If that were also the case for electronics, technicians or vehicle mechanics, then we could spare ourselves the armed forces," he added.

Berkhan also criticized the fact that in the 9 and a half years of his period of service he has yet to encounter a single physician serving in the military, who has not expressed himself negatively on his training, especially his orientation course at the Bundeswehr medical academy. But when it is not even possible to do a half-way adequate job of preparing the training courses, as Woerner has admitted, then this must be changed, or one ought to eliminate the training courses and think of something else.

The training courses ought to be made more practical. It is not without good reason that the Kassenaerztliche Vereinigung (Association of Physicians Participating in Health Insurance Plans) requires that a physician have 2 years of clinical experience before it will qualify him as a participating physician. Physicians performing basic military service, on the other hand, are let loose on mankind, that is to say, the soldiers, immediately after the university. "If by law we obligate our young men to handle weapons, then their medical care must also be right. What wife could still be unconcerned about sending her husband to the Bundeswehr and what parents about their son if they must fear that the medical care of the husband or son is in a deplorable state. I therefore close with the emphatic request not to wait until the 1990's, when supposedly the personnel situation will be eased for medical service officers, but to take all possible conceivable measures right now in regard to personnel as well as material to improve the medical care of our soldiers," said the military representative.

9746

CSO: 3620/34

ASSIGNMENT, HEADROOM PROBLEMS EASING

Bonn DIE WELT in German 6 Oct 84 p 10

[Article by Ruediger Moniac]

[Excerpt] Bonn--In the debate of the FRG parliament on the annual report of the military representative, the social position of the soldiers was a subject of special interest. In this regard, spokesmen of the SPD parliamentary group joined in the criticism by the Bundeswehr Association, which had dismissed the most recent efforts of the Defense Ministry as a "policy of doing nothing." SPD defense expert Heistermann joined in this criticism by calling Manfred Woerner an "announcement minister."

On behalf of the minister, who could not take part in the debate because of a troop visit by the president of the Federal Republic, parliamentary undersecretary Wuerzbach rejected such blame as groundless. According to Wuerzbach, under Woerner's responsibility 2 years ago, the ministry had begun the gradual improvement of the social situation of the soldiers. These efforts would be continued without interruption. As performance already achieved, among other things, Wuerzbach pointed out initial success in reducing the pileup in assignments for noncommissioned officers. And 3,500 "changes" had already been achieved. The squad leaders on the armored personnel carriers would gradually be promoted to staff sergeants. And for the officers of the military technical service, the chances for promotion to captain have also improved recently. Sought is a ratio of 60 to 40 between lieutenants/first lieutenants and captains.

According to Wuerzbach, the Bundeswehr has "never had more noncommissioned officers than today." To be sure, military representative Berkhan is correct when he criticizes that young noncommissioned officers need better training and their abilities for the correct handling of draftees must be strengthened. In addition, the military representative had indicated, among other things, the inadequate treatment of soldiers by medical officers. This, too, is correct, stressed the undersecretary. But the shortcomings would be eliminated quickly.

9746

CSO: 3620/54

OFFICERS WANT COUNTERARMAMENT ENDED

Bonn DIE WELT in German 9 Oct 84 p 4

[Article by Ruediger Moniac]

[Text] Bonn--In a press conference yesterday in Bonn, in which they demanded changes in the defense policy of the Federal Government, Bundeswehr officers presented themselves as clear critics of the NATO strategy. Members of the working group DARMSTAEDTER SIGNAL demanded the withdrawal of the "so-called counterarmament" and negotiations with the East that are "truly supported by the will to come to an understanding." As "confidence-building preliminary measures" in this connection, they recommended an "armaments-stop," the immediate removal of all chemical weapons, and a clear reduction in nuclear munitions. In the DARMSTAEDTER SIGNAL from September 1983, they had demanded "a discontinuance of the security-threatening so-called counterarmament with Pershing 2 and cruise missiles."

Especially these views of the soldiers, but others as well, are outside the policy of the alliance and the previous and present Federal Government. In the Federal Defense Ministry at the Hardthoehe, therefore, they are examining the question of whether the signers of appeals such as that of the DARMSTAEDTER SIGNAL are guilty of a violation of their official duties. The Servicemen's Law requires of officers and noncommissioned officers "that they maintain the discretion in their statements on and off duty that is necessary to preserve the trust that they have as superiors." In addition, "as a superior, a soldier may not influence his subordinates for or against a political opinion." It has heretofore been unclear whether soldiers are violating their duties when they organize press conferences, as now in Bonn, in which they criticize the policies of their "employer." In any case, the organizers of the press conference say that in the field forces there is strong pressure to conform being exerted by the Defense Ministry.

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GENSCHER URGES WEU ACTIVATION

Bonn DIE WELT in German 9 Oct 84 p 7

[Article by Bernt Conrad]

[Text] Bonn--Federal Foreign Minister Genscher, currently chairman of the Council of Ministers of the West European Union [WEU], wants to push the reactivation of the WEU, made up of Great Britain, France, Italy, the Benelux countries and the FRG. This purpose is to be served by a special meeting of the foreign and defense ministers called on behalf of the 30th anniversary of the WEU and by a meeting of the parliamentary WEU assembly in Rome at the end of October.

An article on principles published yesterday in the EUROPÄISCHE ZEITUNG shows that with the reanimation of the WEU, the federal foreign minister wants not only to "strengthen the European pillar of NATO." He would also like to promote European arms cooperation, encourage the arms control dialogue between East and West, discuss security-policy aspects of European relations with the Third World, and give some impetus to a new "security-policy level" in the EEC.

Genscher sees the following new tasks for the WEU within NATO and in close coordination with the United States:

The organization could serve as a forum to coordinate all subjects in which a common European position in the alliance is advisable. In the framework of their committees, the available European resources for conventional defense should be better coordinated with each other and made more efficient in their use. In the view of the federal foreign minister, the present 7 to 1 ratio of European procurement in the United States to American procurement in Europe is unsatisfactory.

The WEU should give additional impetus to the arms control dialogue. In addition, it could contribute to consolidating the course of the alliance based upon the Harmel Report of 1967 and to promoting cooperation with the East. The WEU should also involve itself with aspects of security policy in Europe's relations with the Third World.

Genscher also hopes for "positive impulses for the formation of a third, security-policy level in the process of European unification."

BRIEFS

ALTERNATIVE SERVICE 24 MONTHS--Bonn, 17 Oct--The decision made by the cabinet on Wednesday to create the legal preconditions for an extension of military service from 15 to 18 months before the end of this legislative period also raises the question of the effects of this change on the civilian service. In accordance with the reform law for conscientious objectors that went into effect on 1 January of this year, the civilian service is one-third longer than basic military service, for the latter is only part of the entire military obligation of each citizen. Currently, however, it is still completely open whether or not this will actually be the case. One reason for this is the fact that the law is only in effect until 30 June 1986. Another reason is the fact that on the motion of the SPD-governed Lands and a portion of the SPD parliamentary representatives, a norm-control proceeding is pending before the Federal Constitutional Court, upon which a decision is likely to be reached in 1985. Were the proceeding to be completely or partially successful, then this would have a direct effect on the legal situation and would be an additional reason for the Federal Parliament to deal with this subject once again. [Excerpt] [Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 18 Oct 84 p 2] 9746

CSO: 3620/54

PRODUCTION PLANS FOR ITOW ANTIARMOR MISSILES ON HOLD

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 27 Sep 84 p 3

/Article by Jukka Knuuti: "Manufacture of ITOW Missiles for Finland Suspended"/

/Text/ The scandal involving defective microcircuits which has shaken the U.S. defense forces now touches Finland as well. The ITOW antitank missiles intended for our country have ended up on the list of weapons whose manufacture is suspended until further notice because of defects.

In experimental firings done in the United States it has happened in some cases that only one of the engines on each side of the missile ignited and the missile spun around.

Finland is the 33rd country to procure these weapons for its use. The missiles have not been brought in yet, and Finns are in the United States right now learning how to use the weapon system.

The missile coming to Finland is a so-called second generation device. The roughly 65-cm-long missile weighs about 20 kg and is able to penetrate all known armor at a distance of 500 to 3,750 meters. The missile is fired from an apparatus weighing approximately 100 kg; as far as one knows, the intention is to place it in the crew-transport tanks manufactured by Sisu.

T-72 Vehicles Flammable

A few weeks ago SOTILASAIKAKAUSLEHTI quoted an article published in the German journal WEHRTECHNIK about the experiences of the T-72 vehicle in the Lebanon war.

According to information based on Israeli sources, the vehicle easily caught on fire after being hit. The ammunition space of the vehicle's automatic loading system is thought to be the reason. The T-72 is one of the world's few vehicles equipped with automatic loading.

Lt Gen Pentti Vayrynen, military finance chief from the General Staff, is not worried about the criticism which the vehicle has received. He has previously stated in an interview he gave that the T-72 has been studied and found appropriate for us.

AMMUNITION DUMPS TO BE RELOCATED AT SAINT-CYR

Paris LE FIGARO in French 21 Sep 84 p 10

/Article by Jean-Pierre Cressard/

/Text/ Beignon, a commune with 600 residents, has just clashed with the Ministry of Defense because the 3rd Military Region will concentrate its ammunition dumps at the Saint Cyr-Coetquidan (Morbihan) camp.

Close to inhabited areas and difficult to secure, the dumps of Saint Ave near Vannes and of Chateauneuf-d'Ille at Vilaine will soon be closed. Budgetary reasons have to be added to these factors. The ammunition will then be transferred to Coetquidan, a camp where the cadets of the French Army are trained.

This operation would have taken place without trouble if part of the commune of Beignon had not been included in the security periphery of the dump and thus subject by virtue of that fact to the directives of the military authority for its prospective construction licenses. "We cannot accept a possible risk of explosion," Jean-Pierre Le Thiec, chairman of the defense committee, asserted, "and especially the drop in our real estate values. Who will want to purchase our homes located close to a dump holding 2,800 tons of ammunition?"

Today, 19 September, at the conclusion of the public hearing, it appears that the majority of the inhabitants of Beignon are against the existing solution even though 10 percent of the economically active population are employed at the Coetquidan camp. They recommend that the ammunition dump be moved 800 meters farther inside the camp. But this solution would have the inconvenience of rendering a firing range for cadets unusable.

The drop in the number of ammunition dumps also has as its consequence the closing of the French Navy dump in Cherbourg. Accordingly, Daniel Coespel, CFTC /French Confederation of Christian Workers/ delegate at the Cherbourg arsenal, has suggested storing the French Army ammunition in the Normandy dump. But in the view of the military, this alternative is hardly realistic.

Indeed, the major portion of this ammunition is slated for the 9th Naval Infantry Division two of whose infantry regiments are based in Vannes and in Le Mans, the tank regiment in Vannes, and the artillery regiment near Rennes. Now, as is known, this division is charged with overseas missions (such as

those in Chad and Lebanon) and it can be ordered to leave on extremely short notice. For the military chiefs, it is not very reasonable to store ammunition 250 km away from these garrisons.

The defense committee of Beignon wishes to protect the interests of the inhabitants without for all that evidencing an antimilitarist stance and it seeks to avoid political implications such as those which occurred at the Larzac camp. Accordingly, the local Socialist activists have written to the Socialist minister of defense, Charles Hernu, in the hope that a compromise solution may be found shortly. But in the Beignon affair, some much more passionate partisans are also involved, whether they be Breton separatists or ecologists who would like to make some waves on this occasion. And in this case, there is a preference for skipping such discussions.

2662

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RETIRING NAVAL COMMANDER RUDBERG ASSESSES ANTISUB EFFORT

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 30 Sep 84 p 25

[Article by Ola Gummeson and Erik Liden: "Submarine Hunt Sadly Mishandled"]

[Text] It is as a chastened Navy chief that Vice Admiral Per Rudberg today leaves active service in the Armed Forces after nearly 46 years of military experience. The last 4 years of intense submarine chase, with political repercussions for Sweden's relations with a foreign power, have kept him occupied almost around the clock during certain periods.

"The submarine problems both have and have not been the most difficult decision-making issue I had to resolve throughout many years of various executive positions in the Armed Forces. The feeling of powerlessness I and other personnel experienced, when the new pattern of violation became clear a bit into the 1980's, was very distressing."

"The justified demands of the general public for results and the pressure on the personnel to do a satisfactory job in antisubmarine warfare with insufficient equipment, sometimes left me sleepless."

"Sometimes there were profane words for the Navy personnel as well, but, happily, the reality of it made an impression on the responsible political leadership of the country, which the warnings by me and my predecessors during the 1960's and 1970's had failed to do."

Suddenly Per Rudberg had an audience for a defense activity, which for two decades had been given reduced priority in central political and military decisions.

Mishandled Sector

"I do not hesitate to say that antisubmarine warfare is a sadly mishandled sector. Various decisions have had the result that the training has a much too shallow basis, that for a long period Swedish industry has shown little interest in underwater issues and that research and technical knowledge at the Defense Research Institute and the Defense Materiel Command have been seriously neglected."

Rudberg stresses that problems which need to be solved quickly are the issues of materiel for antisubmarine warfare. Training must be improved, a concentration on Swedish industry must be undertaken, as well as priority given to questions of research and technology.

"We have been losing capability and knowledge for 20 years and have not been able to keep up with the rapid technical development in the underwater area. It is distressing for all of society. Had we retained the underwater capability, then Sweden would today have much greater opportunities for keeping up with the offshore sector, for example."

"The little amount of understanding previously awarded the antisubmarine warfare capability could have been fatal to our entire defense capability. It is by no means just in peacetime that submarine violations occur. This activity becomes even more intense in times of crisis and war."

As Early as the 1970's

In his farewell interview Per Rudberg reveals that analyses of submarine reports from the 1970's show that minisubs in various forms were found in Swedish waters even then.

"We have reexamined reports, which at that time we dismissed with the words, for instance, 'that no submarine can pass in these shallow bays,' and we have found similarities with the 1980's violations."

"Divers, who openly go ashore near secret installations, are a totally new phenomenon, however. That we can see now, after careful scrutiny of the activity during previous years. The technology has changed rapidly and the violations have gradually increased in a serious way."

"The credibility problems--as a result of unsuccessful submarine hunting--for the Navy and all of the Armed Forces were most serious during 1982-83. Now, we have gotten over these problems and sense a strong support for our measures from the entire Swedish society."

Per Rudberg experiences the reinforcement of the antisubmarine defense as problematic, for several reasons.

"First, it is not easy quickly to find the right devices which are available over the counter and can be installed in our units. Foreign submarine technology is based on hunting in large, open seas, where the Baltic Sea problems of brackish water and varying temperature zones do not exist."

"Second, it is not easy to adapt the foreign facilities, such as sonars, which we are now buying. There is a lack of knowledge and we have to proceed by trial and error."

"Third, it has been downright embarrassing to hear all the critical voices who want to buy antisubmarine materiel even more rapidly. During one period

everything we did was questioned, but I feel that those overtones have now died down."

Not Just Antisubmarine Warfare

"Fourth, the Navy cannot over an extended period concentrate solely on antisubmarine warfare. Then there would be obvious risk that new gaps would occur in the long-term readiness, that is to say the invasion defense which Parliament has rightly made a priority. A balance is needed in the defense force, for which ultimately the supreme commander is responsible."

"Both I and my predecessors believe that the Navy has been passed over and must be strengthened. I have maintained that an increase by a factor of two for both weapon carriers and weapons is necessary, if we are to live up to the goals on which there is political agreement. In the name of justice, large reinforcements are also needed for the Air Force and some supplements for the Army."

Per Rudberg is very satisfied with the outspoken support of the politicians for military activity in a difficult era, and with the government's actions in difficult situations.

"I find nothing to criticize. There is also no friction in the cooperation between the supreme commander and the other service branches. Lennart Ljung is an excellent person, who always has constructive proposals. I have great respect for him as supreme commander."

On the other hand, Per Rudberg is somewhat critical of the supreme commander's proposal for centralizing the information activity of the Armed Forces in an expanded information department within the Defense Staff.

"Obviously, the service branches must deliver information on technology and tactics as independent authorities. I regard this as the obligation of the Navy chief in the future as well. The major security-political issues should be handled by the supreme commander, however, and I think he is partly right that the overall situation needs firming up."

In the Military by Chance

"'Cobbler, Stick to Your Last' is an expression which may well be used in these connections. On the other hand, I don't believe that the supreme commander's proposal is based on the problems we have had in providing correct information concerning various submarine reports and violations. Providing correct information about foreign submarines, without revealing our sensitive reconnaissance methods, is complicated."

Throughout his long military career, which began by chance, Per Rudberg has devoted himself extensively to security-political issues.

Ever since, during a family holiday on the west coast, he was almost adopted by a fisherman who had lost two sons in World War I when their ship was torpedoed, the sea has fascinated the retiring Navy chief.

"Daddy was bishop of Skara and my mother, who is still alive, was troubled by hay fever, which is why we went far out toward the western sea each summer. There are no naval traditions whatsoever in my family, which has consisted mostly of farmers."

"I volunteered for wartime service in the summer of 1940 between my junior and senior years of high school in Stockholm. The advantage was that I was allowed to start later in the fall and came home a national hero."

"I and a few friends then 'cheated our way into enlistment' by going to the Navy Staff. We were referred to Commander Gosta Wahlstrom, head of the Stockholm Naval Station, which had long been located at Skeppsholmen, where later we were also enrolled in the Naval Staff College. In 1943 it moved out to Nasby Park."

Per Rudberg remembers his initial years as a naval officer with pleasure, although the first 10 years included nearly 8 years of sea duty.

"I married early, and not until I was older did I realize what a situation my wife with three small children was placed in. But society was different then than now. No television, strong family bonds and citizens, who during the wartime years lived in modest circumstances, contributed to the fact that I and my wife coped with those years."

During the war Per Rudberg was fire-control officer on HMS "Fylgia," which, among other things, watched German warships with live pieces of artillery.

"Then we really felt the vicinity of the war, something which many young people today cannot imagine. For me, antisubmarine warfare takes place against this background."

"No lives have been lost, but to me it is urgent that both the government and the supreme commander give their full support to those who ultimately push the button during submarine contact. For I know how easy it is for an officer one day to be regarded as a hero, in order next day to hear that he is a murderer."

"However, the Navy personnel appreciates the positive opinion which is spreading across the country and which expresses full support for the very difficult duties of the Navy."

"I tip my hat to conscription and to all the positive volunteer forces. This inherited tradition makes a big impression during all foreign visits."

Even at the moment of farewell it is the submarines which dominate the exchange of opinions. A Navy chief, who does not believe that in the long run

Sweden will be able to master the violation problems, is not a real Navy chief.

Become Active in SVENSKA DAGBLADET

"On the other hand, I can never guarantee that the violations will cease completely," Per Rudberg says. "Even if they seem to cease we will continue the buildup of our antisubmarine defense, in order constantly to be able to protect ourselves."

"I think that the principal of the uninvited intruders will finally realize that the risks incurred during operations in the Swedish archipelago are becoming so great, that the operations do not serve any sensible purpose."

Admiral Rudberg is stepping ashore after more than 40 years as a naval officer and will move from his official residence on Skeppsholmen to Varmdo, where he will devote himself to local politics, reading history and writing military articles in SVENSKA DAGBLADET, among others, where he is on the board of the foundation.

"That is where I will now become active," Rudberg says.

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GOVERNMENT ORDERS MORE RAPID REPORTING OF AIR SPACE INTRUSIONS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 4 Oct 84 p 6

[Article by Lars Christiansson: "Faster Information About Violations"]

[Text] The procedures for how to report violations of Swedish airspace to the Cabinet Office will be made more efficient. In the future, information from the Defense Staff will be delivered more rapidly and securely than what was the case in connection with the Soviet aircraft violation over Gotland on August 9.

On that occasion the Foreign Ministry did not receive the written report and the investigation by the Defense Staff until August 17, and that same day it summoned the Soviet charge d'affaires Evgeny Rymko.

The government made its decision about the new procedures during its meeting at Bommersvik on Wednesday.

The government further decided that aircraft violations will be included in supreme commander's quarterly reports on submarine violations. The administration also decided to come forward and inform the general public voluntarily about serious violations in connection with the reporting of such violations by the military to the Foreign Ministry, as well as to account for the measures taken by the administration because of the violation.

The administration made its decision on the basis of a review of existing procedures undertaken by Cabinet Secretary Pierre Schori at the Foreign Ministry, State Secretary Per Borg at the Defense Ministry, State Secretary Ulf Larsson in the Cabinet Office and Defense Staff Chief Bror Stefenson. The committee was appointed following criticism that neither the non-socialist nor the general public had been informed of Soviet aircraft violations.

"We have reviewed the procedures internally, so that now they will be faster and safer," Cabinet Secretary Pierre Schori told SVENSKA DAGBLADET.

Defense Staff Chief Bror Stefenson says in a comment that he is satisfied with the decision taken by the administration.

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SUSPECTED EAST BLOC SPY IN ARMED FORCES' MAIN COMPUTER CENTER

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 7 Oct 84 p 6

[Article by Roger Magnergard: "Foiled the Armed Forces and Foreign Ministry; Spy Allowed to Work Undisturbed in Secret Data Facility"]

[Text] He was a computer expert and spoke German. The man he said he was had been dead for several years. Nonetheless, he was given permission to work at one of the Armed Forces' secret data facilities in Arboga for a whole week.

"No one knows how much information the man had access to," a Sapo [Swedish Security Police] source tells SVENSKA DAGBLADET. "There are many secret data at the computer facility."

After a week in Arboga, the man abandoned his Swedish family. He withdrew a large amount of money from the bank and returned the rented car. After that he vanished. It is likely that he was an East bloc spy, who in this manner wormed his way into one of the most top-secret facilities of the Armed Forces.

Surrounded by Great Secrecy

The incident took place in 1979, but is still surrounded by great secrecy, since the Security Police is still looking for the man.

He had arrived in Sweden from the FRG one or a few years before. He married here, had children, incurred large debts and settled in a medium-sized Swedish town.

The man was employed by a service company, but this was bought by another one, which works for the Armed Forces, among others. His task at the computer center in Arboga during this spring week was to install new telecommunications equipment.

Naturally, the man's identity was checked before he was allowed into the facility. This was done by the Foreign Ministry. Exactly how it was done is not clear, but the checking was obviously defective.

Worked Alone in the Building

After being cleared by the Foreign Ministry, he was allowed into the Arboga facility. On at least one occasion during the evening he was permitted to work alone in the building.

"There was no computer processing that evening," says the security chief of the Defense Computer Center (FDC), Lennart Nygren, to SVENSKA DAGBLADET.

"This is why it is extremely unlikely that the man succeeded in acquiring any secret documents or data material."

That opinion is not shared by Sapo.

"If he had worked as a normal user he would not have done any damage," one source says. "But in all likelihood he was an expert--which is why it is likely that he obtained secret material."

The chairman of the automatic data processing department at Stockholm University, Janis Bubenko, also shares that opinion.

Summoned Experts Investigated

"For an extraordinarily clever expert it is possible to start up a computer, obtain material and shut it down without leaving traces."

After completing his task in Arboga, the man disappeared. Sapo has traced his actions as far as possible.

The first weekday afterwards he drove to the bank and withdrew a large amount of money. He replaced the rented car he had had in a parking lot.

Abandoned a Family in Debt

Then he disappeared and abandoned his family with large debts.

His employer noticed his absence and asked the wife where he was. She did not know, and after some time the FDC was notified, which got in touch with Sapo.

When the man's identity was checked more closely, it turned out that the name and birth year he had given belonged to an FRG citizen. He was married and said to be living in an West German town. The problem was only that he had died in the mid-1970's.

Experts were called in to investigate the computer facility in minute detail.

"Our investigations yielded nothing which indicated that he had obtained any information," Lennart Nygren says.

Unknown Secret Data

Since then the programs have been changed and exchanged. Today there is believed to be no risk that he has programmed in any "unpleasant surprise," which will be activated on a specific day in the future.

It is still not known what the man's secret mission was. One theory put forward to SVENSKA DAGBLADET is that, besides stealing the available data, he was supposed to make a map of the building. Another is that he was to facilitate the "tapping" of the computer--that is to say crack the secret codes which are required to have access to the data material.

Used a Dead Man's Identity

Unanimous, but not confirming, reports maintain that the man was traced to the GDR and identified there as an agent.

"The method of using a dead man's identity is frequently used by the East bloc espionage system," one source of information says.

Today the case is closed for the Defense Computer Center. Nothing like it has happened since then.

"That useful incident had the result that we have increased our activity even more," FDC chief Sture Edvindsson tells SVENSKA DAGBLADET.

The Incident Cannot Be Repeated

Security police experts confirm that personnel investigation has become much better after the incident and that "it is likely that the event cannot be repeated."

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TAX RELIEF PROGRAM CRITICIZED FOR LACKING REAL REFORMS

Duesseldorf WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE in German 14 Sep 84 pp 62-74

[Text] The tax cut decided on by the Federal Government is turning out to be a disappointment. The tax breaks are not even enough to compensate for the concealed tax hikes. But above all any genuine attempt at reform is lacking.

CSU head Franz Josef Strauss sought support from an objective observer: "I take the following quotation from the WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE," said Strauss before the German Bundestag, "an instrument of economic opinion which is not exactly in the service of the opposition parties, after all. There it is said: 'What has emerged in this area from the work of the century has become a consumptive changeling.' " Then he resorted again to his own vocabulary: In connection with the law in question, one should "not speak of a major tax reform, because that would be nothing more than terminological trickery. Surely this has nothing more to do with a major tax reform!"

The scolding by Strauss was no recent objection from the direction of Munich--he spoke the words 10 years ago, when in the Bundestag there was a debate about the then Social-Liberal tax laws. Yet this could apply likewise to the body of laws which after tough wrangling about scheduling and content the Christian-Liberal Federal Government wants to pass in the third week of November as a cabinet bill.

There has been no lack of superlatives in the announcements. Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl at the Stuttgart CDU party congress in May of this year: "With this largest tax reform in the history of our republic, we want to see to it that productive work is again worth while." Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg, who is given to hard-headed observations, took pains to subsequently put straight the Chancellor's statement: The payers of taxes on salaries and other income could expect "by far the greatest tax cut in the history of the FRG." Now the tax package threatens to become the greatest flop of the Federal Government. Even before the base values of the government had been incorporated into the officials' draft of the Finance Ministry, dissatisfaction was spreading. Experts at the Rhine-Westphalia Institute for Economic Research (RWI) in Essen perceived "a considerable discrepancy between the claim of the submitted

plans to be the most comprehensive tax relief in the history of the FRG and their foreseeable consequences." The Munich Ifo Institute for Economic Research complained that the tax breaks, which according to their present status are to come into force in two stages, in 1986 and 1988, are "too little and too late" in arriving.

Even those on the practical side have reacted with displeasure. The second stage is "much too pusillanimous," criticized the chairman of the Federation of Chambers of German Industry and Commerce, Otto Wolff von Amerongen, in saying that "what has been provided is a corrective adjustment in the tax scale, not a reform of this scale."

And the Federation of German Industries could not find any "prospects, not even at the least down the road" for reforming domestic business taxation. In any case the trade unions, which would have preferred to have had an employment program costing billions, dismissed the government's package as an "election-campaign stunt."

Even among taxpayers, joy is not likely to become widespread when they perceive how few taxes they will really be relieved of paying. Because of the fact that the Christian-Liberal coalition members could not come to a definite agreement on whether they should give partiality to occupational income and thus occupational performance or instead to the raising of children, they are allotting something to everybody. And because to Stoltenberg a date of coming into force of 1 January 1986 was too costly, and to the Free Democrats and the CSU a realization on 1 January 1988 was too belated, the apportionment is being done bit by bit.

For both stages together, the finance minister has acknowledged a total volume of 20.2 billion marks. Some 11 billion go to make up the first stage--5.2 billion marks for raising the children's exemption to 2,484 marks per child, and 5.8 billion for lifting the basic tax exemption to 4,536/9,072 marks (unmarried/married) as well as for a slight flattening of the progression curve.

For many taxpayers, above all for those who do not have any children, the 1986 tax break is in the pocket-money range. The unmarried worker with average earnings who has to pay taxes on 30,000 marks per year saves about 12 marks per month. Two years later, with the second stage, a little less than 17 marks more are added.

Matters look more propitious for better-paid salaried workers in senior positions and for self-employed people who are more severely fleeced by the progressive scale. With an annual taxable income of 70,000 marks, in 1986 the monthly saving amounts to 70 marks for the time being, and in 1988 another 117 marks are saved.

Families with children fare far better in the first stage. From 1986 on, the family man with two children who pays taxes on 34,000 marks per year will have 67 marks less in taxes withdrawn per month. On the other hand, in the second stage he misses out. The father making 70,000 marks with two children saves at least 182 marks monthly after the coming into force of

the two relief segments. Top earners with 300,000 marks in annual income who are married and enjoy tax exemptions for two children will be given a tax break totaling 750 marks per month.

This variable tax relief is running up against criticism above all within the opposition. For SPD fraction chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel, it "must be realized quite clearly that this Federal Government is violating the principles of social fairness." And the SPD tax expert Dieter Spoeri gives the rebuke "that taxpayers with monthly incomes of 10,000 marks and more are riding high, whereas average earners are being put off with crumbs."

The Christian-Democratic finance minister does not intend to take the charge lying down that this is creating a "tax reform for the rich." His argument: The "dramatic rise in the marginal tax burden" for incomes above 50,000 marks must be mitigated. In fact, in these salary classes only small portions of income increases are left to the employee, because of the large subtractions in taxes and social welfare charges. For an unmarried employee in the intermediate and higher salary categories, only a scant sum of 30 marks is left from 100 marks of a salary increase--the rest is pocketed by the tax collector and the social insurance system. With married persons in the higher income brackets, the subtractions from income increases already amount to almost 50 percent.

The tighter grip of the treasury with increasing income also affects income raises which merely compensate for the inflation rate. In other words: The tax load grows progressively, although the taxpayer's ability to pay does not increase. And this applies--in the past as well as in the future--to all income in the progressive-scale zone, namely income above 18,000 marks for unmarried people and 36,000 marks for married people. Because of this unfriendly progressive scale, the revenue from the tax on workers' income is growing far more rapidly than total gross wages and salaries.

But with that, for Stoltenberg the full-bodied declarations of CDU/CSU politicians from their opposition period are becoming an inherited burden. Some years ago, CDU/CSU politicians had introduced into the political debate the slogan of "concealed tax hikes" with respect to the progressively larger tax burden on purely nominal increases in income--and had given the impression among the voters that such a thing would not be the case under their regency.

Back in 1973 the CDU/CSU opposition had demanded "the removal of concealed tax hikes" (CDU Bundestag member Hans-joerg Haefele). And just 2 weeks before the transition in the Bonn government in the autumn of 1982, the then deputy chief of the CDU/CSU fraction, Alfred Dregger, lashed out in the Bundestag at the "mulishness" with which the Social-Liberal Federal Government "balks at correcting concealed tax hikes by adjusting the progressive scale to the inflation rate." A few months before, Baden-Wuerttemberg Minister President Lothar Spaeth had estimated the inflation-caused additional receipts of the government at 50 to 60 billion marks by 1985, and had spoken about the necessity for a "tax relief plan for 1984" on this order of magnitude.

The Karl-Braeuer Institute of the Federation of Taxpayers (using as its reference points the overall base values of the Federal Government) comes up with an exact figure of 51 billion marks for the concealed tax hikes just for the period of time from 1981, the year of the last income tax cut, to 1985. This institute also counters the objections that the Christian Democrat Haefele is meanwhile raising against such calculations from his new viewpoint as the non-cabinet state secretary in Bonn's Finance Ministry.

The RWI--which in a prediction for the years from 1983 to 1988 contrasted the probable actual yield from wage and other income taxes with the inflation-corrected revenues--calculates for the year 1988 an amount of almost 36 billion marks in concealed tax hikes.

In light of such sums, the 20 billion marks of relief appears modest. The consequence for the majority of taxpayers: Even after the 1986 tax package, their income will be taxed more sharply than before 1983.

In this connection, the consequences of increasing tax loads are thoroughly familiar to the politicians. Bavarian Minister President Franz Josef Strauss, once finance minister in the Grand Coalition, previously noted "unmistakable signs of the overburdening of the citizen subject to these taxes and levies." According to Strauss, these include "the decline of taxpayer honesty" in equal measure with the "dramatic increase in the underground economy," the augmentation of outstanding tax debts, and "finally the full utilization of every possibility of illegal tax evasion and legal depreciation, even when the risk is high, the yield is slight, and the effort is disproportionately high."

The harder the treasury knuckles down, the more the resistance of the citizen to the tax collector grows--an almost banal fundamental perception which was promulgated quite a long time ago by Guenter Schmoelders, one of the fathers of taxpayer psychology.

And the stronger the graduated scale works on the individual, the higher is his net yield if he manages to divert portions of his income past the tax collector. According to the doyen of German financial theory, Fritz Neumark, the prospect of large tax savings leads to the situation where the State is virtually promoting an "uneconomic, wasteful policy of expenditures and costs." Because many a person is lured into making even economically unreasonable expenditures simply because they are recognized by the tax office as deductible.

The misdirecting of economic resources--as exemplified by the patterns of building sponsorship and by depreciation chaos--is only one aspect. Konrad Littmann, chairman of the scientific advisory board for the Federal Ministry of Finance: "The income tax is tending to become more and more an unjust tax, because with increasing nominal income and thus with an increasing tax burden it becomes more and more rewarding for the clever taxpayers to begin a hunt for loopholes in the tax law." How clever German taxpayers have become is shown by an example which the North Rhine-Westphalian finance minister, Diether Posser, has made known: One 35-year-

old self-employed person managed to lower his gross income of about 800,000 marks per year to such an extent for tax purposes that he was obligated to pay only 72,000 marks in taxes instead of about 400,000 marks.

The unclear boundary between the--non-deductible--private living expenses and the--deductible--business expenses helps self-employed people and businessmen above all to save on taxes: This ranges from the business car which is used almost exclusively for private purposes up to the tax-saving combining of attendance at a convention with a vacation. Apart from illicit work, for average wage earners and employees the loopholes are smaller, such as laying claim to the full mileage allowance for travel to work despite participation in a carpool, or the converting for tax purposes of the guest room or a children's room into a work room at home. It was not the tax office but the postal service which stumbled upon a new trick by inventive taxpayers: Bricks are sent off by mail to fictional addresses in the GDR--for each GDR package the tax office allows a flat deduction of 40 marks as an exceptional financial burden. Schmoelders indicated even more than 2 decades ago that tax evasion--not only that of the gray zone, but also the blatantly criminal kind--is entirely socially acceptable in the FRG. More than 5 decades ago, Joseph Schumpeter had warned: "Only a low income tax has the moral convictions of the taxpayers on its side."

The Federal Government will not engineer the moral about-face with its own package. Because in the "latent conflict of goals" (Stoltenberg) between tax cuts and budget consolidation, the finance minister has decided in favor of the latter. "The normalization of the State's finances," argues Stoltenberg in reference to the coalition agreement and the government policy statement, "is the most important goal of our financial policy."

Not only in the FRG, but also in other industrial states such as the United States and Great Britain, large national debts have turned out to be the primary brake opposing substantial tax cuts. Stoltenberg has taken warning above all from the negative experiences of the United States, where the tax cuts at first enlarged the budget deficit rapidly, and not even the later additional revenues due to the business upswing could again close the budget gap. "Not for one instant do I believe in the self-financing power of such operations," states the Bonn finance minister, saying that such theories have "in fact led in America to a clear failure in financial policy; this example is a warning."

The treasurer in Bonn acted consistently in tightening up his tax package, originally pegged at 25 billion marks, when in June the coalition leadership refused to allow him to eliminate or curtail various tax concessions and thus prevented a partial financial offset. Also there had not been any shortage of proposals from the ranks of the coalition groups in the Bundestag. The FDP financial policy expert Hans H. Gattermann had declared at the beginning of the year: "In the opinion of the FDP, an essential part of the tax scale reform must be financed by the reduction of subsidies."

At the beginning of his preliminary studies on this body of laws, Stoltenberg himself had seen the "political chance" to "go considerably

further" than his Social-Democratic predecessors in reducing tax subsidies in connection with an effective cut in taxes on wages and other income.

Later, things sounded differently: "In the way that the formation of opinion developed further," admitted the finance minister this summer, "the view among important personages of the coalition parties has prevailed that any offset should be dispensed with after all."

Table: Growing Burden--Growth of Concealed Tax Hikes (in billions of marks)

	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
heimliche Steuereinnahmen (1)	4,4	9,8	14,4	21,1	27,8	35,8
Lohn- und veranlagte Einkommensteuer (nach geltendem Recht) (2)	157,1	166,6	181,5	199,2	216,8	236,4
inflationbereinigtes Aufkommen an Lohn- und veranlagter Einkommensteuer (3)	152,7	156,8	167,1	178,1	189,0	200,6

Key: 1. Concealed tax proceeds
 2. Wage and assessed income tax (according to current law)
 3. Inflation-adjusted revenue from wage and assessed income tax

Source: Rhine-Westphalian Institute for Economic Research

Given the negative result with respect to an abolition of tax concessions, the tax policy maker Stoltenberg has failed to enter, in even the most cautious fashion, into a genuine reforming of the income tax law. Because an extensive simplification is indispensable for any sweeping reform. Today the average citizen already comes to grief over trying to fill out the form for the annual adjustment of his wages tax or his income tax return, where just the instructions for filling it out cover 16 pages. Even though nobody can wish for a return to the 19th century, in which the composer Ludwig van Beethoven got by with a single sentence in his tax return, still the complicating of the tax law has led to indefensible conditions: The innumerable exceptions in the current tax provisions are such as to:

Be an obstacle to any clarity in the taxation process, with even experts foundering on the interpretation of the provisions, so that more and more disputes are being taken to the financial courts (WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE 14/1984);

undermine the principle of equable taxation and in practice reduce to absurdity the concept of progressive taxation--a fair distribution of the tax burden according to the taxpayer's ability to pay;

narrow the assessment bases for taxation in such a way that the income which does not avoid the clutches of the treasury is subject to an unsuitably large tax load.

The people discriminated against by this system--according to the not very surprising perception of the full professor of economics, Hans-Georg Petersen of Linz--are those employees with lower and intermediate incomes who because of the withholding procedure for the wages tax cannot escape from their tax burden, and also small and intermediate businesses which have made a profit and which because of a lack of information or because they are too small are not able to exploit the existing concessions.

For Stoltenberg's scientific adviser Littmann, an income-tax reform does not mean "first and foremost a correcting of the tax scale, but rather an attempt to arrive at a sensible delimitation of the assessment basis"--far more income than hitherto should be covered by taxation. Thus, there is no reason why private profits on sales, most of the proceeds from interest (but not the stock dividends), and also income such as annuities or wage bonuses for nighttime and vacation work should remain taxfree.

The Kiel financial expert Willi Albers has come to the conclusion that if there were a sudden elimination of all the concessions in the present tax law, the tax rate could be reduced by almost half without the State having to do without a single mark of its income.

The economic theorist and financial expert Petersen estimates the most important concessions for private households--he includes in this income splitting for spouses, the annuity and pension privilege, and also the preferential tax treatment of owner-occupied dwellings through user value taxation--at 75 billion marks, and for the businesses at 45 billion marks.

Moreover he conjectures that "because of deficient tax procedures" two thirds of the proceeds from self-employment work, 70 percent of the interest and capital proceeds, and more than 50 percent of the proceeds from renting and leasing are concealed from the financial authorities. Petersen: "If one combines the tax losses because of tax concessions and tax evasion plus the largely questionable financial aid, a diminished yield and an additional expenditure respectively is the result amounting to more than 200 billion marks--a sum which from the aspect of volume lies above the combined yield of the income and corporation tax."

Even though it is not possible to follow this calculation to its ultimate conclusion, simply because one cannot deprive the State of every means of taxation, nevertheless this makes it clear just how many billions are available for a redistribution within the tax system for the benefit of a socially balanced and efficiency-promoting lowering of the tax rates.

But not only in the ivory tower of the scholars is a radical tax simplification being debated. At the end of the 1970's the Christian Democrat Johann Wilhelm Gaddum, as Rhineland-Palatinate finance minister, and the Social Democrat Hans-Joachim Seeler, at that time finance senator in Hamburg, presented far-reaching and concrete proposals with respect to the universal declaration of loyalty to the goal of tax simplification--the stereotyped formula of every officiating finance minister. In his "Hamburg Memorandum on the Further Development of the Tax Law" the Social Democrat had complained of the "scarcely still comprehensible multiplicity of regulations of all types" in the tax law, with which the attempt is being made to consider individual particularities, but which in the last analysis have led again to new inequities. Yet in the field of practical politics Seeler's memorandum remained just as ineffective as Gaddum's "Draft of a Discussion on a Simplified Income Tax Law," which provided for a consideration only of professional expenses and operating expenses and of exceptional tax burdens. All exemptions aside from the basic exemption and other means of taking deductions were to be eliminated. With that Gaddum wanted to finance the introduction of a linear-progressive tax scale which ends up with a maximum tax rate of 50 percent.

For the distant future, Bonn's finance minister likewise wants to replace the tax-rate curve with a straight line (Stoltenberg: "We have said very early that the objective of a linear-progressive scale remains"), but apparently without clearing out the brushwood of provisions. For the chairman of his scientific advisory board, that is not enough as a reform aim. Littmann: "A linear scale is perhaps prettier, but not more equitable than a non-linear progressive scale."


Meanwhile, proposals by even more radical changers of the system among the professors have not even gained entry in a rudimentary way into the political discussion. Thus in the academic world the complete replacement of the income tax by a consumer-goods tax is being debated. No longer income, but consumption will then be subject to taxation--and in fact will be likewise progressively staggered. At first glance such models have quite a lot of charm: A tax on consumer goods includes in a simple way increment values which are realized for purposes relating to consumption, avoids the problem of the periodic setting of limits in the case of markedly fluctuating incomes, prevents inflation-caused distortions of the tax burden, and can dispense with many special regulations.

Yet as long as politicians blow up into an ideological conflict already the question of whether tax evasion should be tolerated in the case of interest on savings accounts or should be suppressed through a withholding tax, the debate about a genuine tax reform in the FRG will not take place.

Here there are some beginnings of understanding. CSU chief Strauss: "The income tax law in its presently effective version was extensively fashioned anew in its basic structure in 1934. It is about time to check over and to codify this law--as well as many other tax laws--from the bottom up."

Even this word from Strauss is already 10 years old.

Graph: Curbed Increase--Development of the National Taxation Ratio and Tax Revenues



- Key:**
1. Without tax cut
 2. Tax revenues (billions of marks)
 3. With tax cut
 4. Taxation ratio (percent)*
 5. *Share of the gross national product
 6. Source: Institute of the German Economy

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GOVERNMENT BACKING OFF FROM PRIVATIZATION EFFORTS

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 8 Oct 84 pp 84-92

[Text] Rudolf Lenhartz, chairman of the board of directors of the state-owned Saarbergwerke (Saar Mines), does not have an easy time with his shareholders. Some times they prohibit him from getting rid of subsidiary companies, at other times they urge him to sell.

When 8 years ago the U.S. firm Easco wanted to pay DM 53 million for the Saarbergwerke subsidiary Belzer-Dowidat, the ruling Christian Democrats on the Saar [River] declined the offer, pointing to the jobs involved. The Saarland holds an interest in the amount of one-fourth in the the Saarbergwerke company, three-fourths are held by the Federal Government.

Today Lenhartz is being pressed by ruling CDU officials in Bonn to sell the tool factory. The price of those days, however, is no longer obtainable: Belzer-Dowidat is now incurring losses.

An unclear policy also in the case of Lufthansa: The national airline company, which is owned by the Federal Government to the extent of four-fifth, has been chosen by the Christian Democrats and Liberals as showpiece enterprise of its privatization policy. Lufthansa shares could quickly be sold at the stock exchanges, the enterprise earns a handsome profit.

But the owners are in disagreement. Bavaria's minister-president, Franz Josef Strauss cast his veto against the privatization of Lufthansa planned by the Kohl Administration.

The to and fro in the case of Belzer-Dowidat and Lufthansa shows what a hard time the people in power are having with their denationalization plans. The privatization of federal enterprises proclaimed in such a grand manner by minister of finance Gerhard Stoltenberg is not making any progress.

The list of enterprises, which would be considered for privatization, is getting shorter every month: Of the approximately 100 firms with their 900 subsidiaries which belong to the Federal Government or in which it holds an interest, in the meantime only a dozen is left on the list. If Strauss has his way and Lufthansa is eliminated as well, then only difficult-to-sell enterprises operating at a loss, such as Belzer-Dowidat, are left.

The people in Bonn most likely had not counted on opposition in their own camp. But in the meantime many Christian Democratic party friends have taken a fancy to the posts which they hold in the management or supervisory board of the state enterprises.

Trade unions and Social Democrats are registering fundamental misgivings about a too zealous privatization. They fear the loss of jobs if the future private owners proceed with rigorous rationalization in the enterprises, which in many cases are operating at a loss.

For the critics, privatization is a "selling of the state" (Uwe Jens of the SPD Bundestag party), for Finance Minister Stoltenberg it is a "contribution to the renewal of the Socialist Market Economy". Chancellor Kohl intends to lead the state back "to the nucleus of its tasks".

There would be a lot to sell: The Federal Government is Germany's largest entrepreneur in terms of turnover, it holds an interest in every tenth of the largest West German firms.

The six industrial companies, which belong to the Federal Government at least in part, have sales of approximately DM 120 billion. At Veba and VW, Salzgit-ter and Saarbergwerke, Viag and Diag there are 420,000 employees, at the banks owned by the Federal Government, at the railway and post office all together more twice as many.

From the breeding of monkeys to the cement trade--the Federal Government as shareholder has diverse interests. It holds an interest in the Leutsche Primatenzentrum [German Primate Center] in Goettingen and, through the Veba, in the construction markets of Raab Karcher. It owns a machine tool firm in the Indian Bangalore and a uranium production facility in the Australian Canberra.


Those who move with Spedition Schenker [Schenker Shipping Company], buys at Divi or the Deutsche SB-Kauf, fills his gas tank with Aral or flies with the Condor [Airline], who purchases bottles of medicine from Wisthoff in Essen or fertilizer from Jacob Gross in Illingen, creates sales for the state. The high-altitude clinic Valbella near Davos belongs to the Federal Government as for the most part the Reiseunternehmen DER [firm of tour operators].

Many federal enterprises make good money and pay dividends. For the 1984 budget, Stoltenberg is anticipating revenues of DM 76 million.

A large number of the firms, however, are operating at a loss. In the case of steel just as little profit can be made at the present time as in the case of coal or the shipyards, along the frontier with East Germany or at the coast. Here the tax payer this year is paying DM 845 million extra.

Many of the 271 firms which Bonn has purchased since 1970 would not have survived the crisis in their industries without the assisting public funds. Only through socialization could jobs be saved in distress areas. The people in power in Bonn, however, would like to divest themselves as quickly as possible of such unprofitable firms.

"The wealth of the Federal Government," says state secretary for finance Hans Tietmeyer, "is not intended as a nursing home for the casualties of the market economy."



Key:

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Federal Ballast? | 12. United Industrial Enterprises, Inc., Berlin/Bonn; DM 570 million |
| 2. DER SPIEGEL | |
| 3. Examples of capital holdings of the Federal Government in enterprises in the FRG | 13. German Housing Development and Land Mortgage Bank, Berlin/Bonn; DM 256 million |
| 4. Amount of nominal capital | 14. German Industrial Equipment GmbH, Berlin; DM 160 million |
| 5. United Electricity and Mining, Inc., Duesseldorf; DM 1.68 billion | 15. German Mortgage Bank, Wiesbaden; DM 244 million |
| 6. Share of the Federal Government | 16. Salzgitter AG [Holding company for steel, shipbuilding, mining, etc.], Salzgitter; DM 425 |
| 7. Volkswagen Co., Inc., Wolfsburg; DM 1.2 billion | 17. Berlin Airport GmbH, Berlin; DM 75 million |
| 8. German Lufthansa, Inc., Cologne; DM 900 million | 18. Schenker & Co GmbH, Berlin; DM 60 million |
| 9. Saar Mining Co., Inc., Saarbruecken; DM 525 million | |
| 10. Bank for Reconstruction, Frankfurt/Main; DM 1 billion | |
| 11. Airport Frankfurt/Main, Inc., Frankfurt/Main; DM 600 million | |

Thus, the privatization list compiled by Stoltenberg and his chief adviser in matters of Federal Government investments Guenter Vogelsang, as of the end of July, in fact contained almost only state enterprises in financial difficulties. Even the United Industrial Enterprises (Viag), with DM 10.7 billion in sales for the group the largest chunk, is again falling into the problem zone. The company of gas, electricity and aluminum plants, to be sure, for the first time in 5 years paid a dividend of 7 percent for 1983. But the next distributions have become questionable.

For the Viag for years to come will still suffer from a misdirected purchase in the United States. The parent company is responsible for annually up to DM 240 million in losses of the U. S. factory SKW Alloys. The enterprise was acquired in 1979. Sharing in the responsibility for the misinvestment is member of the board of directors Werner Lamby--registered CDU member and formerly department director in the Ministry of Finance responsible for the federal enterprises.

Because the Saarbergwerke [Saar Mining Company] and the Salzgitter Company, on account of losses in the hundreds of millions, are nearly unsaleable, subsidiary firms like Belzer-Dowidat and Dr. C. Otto of Salzgitter are included on the list of companies for sale. The Bochum enterprise Dr. C. Otto, which builds coking plants and was acquired only 5 years ago, is an example of how dangerous the privatization adventure can become.

Only three German competitors can be considered as buying agents of the enterprise, which serve the narrow world market for coking plants. "Market correction" is the term used in entrepreneurial German when an annoying competitor is taken out of the market through fusion and factory installations are closed down.

The opposition in Bonn, already at the beginning of the year, when the administration put its first privatization plans into practice, developed the suspicion that in the final analysis the administration is only after the rehabilitation of the budget. A "nation of people's shareholders" Finance Minister Stoltenberg had announced at the time, when Bonn sought to dispose of 4.6 million Veba-shares.

The securities, in accordance with the new 936-Mark Property Participation Law, were to be sold predominantly to employees with relatively low incomes. However, with a selling price of DM 174 on the average, the interest of the investors in the middle of the stock exchange high of the past few years was low --although Bonn granted employees a bonus of up to DM 59 per share.


The sale of 13.75 of the 43.75 percent of the Federal Government's share in the Veba nevertheless yielded DM 770 million for the state treasury. The purchases came predominantly from funds and large investors from the United States and the Middle East.

"This had nothing to do with promotion of the middle class," Erich Riedl, CSU-deputy in Bonn remarked critically. In so doing, he observed, only the influence of large-scale industry or foreign investors was strengthened.

The critic from Munich had such an impact on the people in Bonn that they

dropped more extensive privatization plans in the case of the Veba. Besides, the people in Bonn had in the meantime recognized the advantages of the Veba. In the conglomerate with its hundreds of firms there is plenty of room for political friends, who are looking for a sideline.

Stoltenberg adviser Vogelsang, who receives DM 25,000 in expense allowances from the federal treasury, to be sure, has been directing the Veba-supervisory board for years. But in the case of full-scale privatization he would in all likelihood lose his job. State secretary for finance Tietmeyer and his colleague for economic questions Dieter von Wuerzen are involved in the control board as well. Even for the assistant to the chancellor, Waldemar Schreckenberg, a lawyer, a place was found as economic adviser--in the supervisory board of the Veba-subsidary Stinnes. As in the Veba, many CDU-followers in the meantime have found refuge in the supervisory boards of the banks, trading firms, and industrial companies working under the federal flag. After in the meantime all important control posts were filled with like-minded civil servants [Ministerialen], old party friends are now being supplied with posts in management.



Key:

- | | |
|--|-----------------|
| 1. In Red Figures | 3. Expenditures |
| 2. Burden on the federal budget through its investments in thousands of DM | 4. Deficit |
| | 5. Revenues |
| | 6. DER SPIEGEL |

The former budget expert of the CDU parliamentary party, Horst Schroeder, relieved the Social Democrat Karl-Heinz Sohn as general manager at the DEG (German Development Company). CSU-politician Walter Althammer in December will become a member of the board of directors of the Equalization of War Burdens Bank, with an annual salary of about DM 200,000.

Understandable that the people, who at times had to wait for 13 years for the desirable jobs during the SPD-regency, have now learned to enjoy their work.

This is particularly true of one person: Franz Josef Strauss has been a member of the supervisory board of the Lufthansa. There he works, as fellow supervisors confirm, "industriously" and distinguishes himself through "astounding expert knowledge".

A privatization of the Lufthansa is out of the question for Strauss--because of strong industry interests. For many years, Strauss has been chairman of the board of supervisors of the Deutsche Airbus GmbH [German Airbus GmbH]. He is fearful that, without state influence, the Lufthansa could possibly decide in favor of jets of the U.S. competitor Boeing, instead of buying airbuses.

In the argumentation Strauss at first gave precedence to others. In accordance with an agreement reached with like-minded members of the supervisory board, Lufthansa board of directors chairman Heinz Ruhnau, a Social Democrat, registered reservations concerning partial privatization with the owner. In a first step, the people in Bonn intended to reduce the federal share to 51 percent.

There is "a great difference, " Ruhnau warned "as person" and not as employed manager, "whether the Lufthansa comes forward with the protective shield of the state or as one of many private enterprises."

With a reduction of the federal share, according to Ruhnau, the "identification of the state administration" with the Lufthansa as national airline company becomes perceptibly smaller. Foreign interested parties could gain influence on the enterprise.

Strauss-intimate Riedl added another one: "There may be spheres of the economy, in which Arab fugitive money is welcome, but in so important a sector as air transportation this must remain impossible at any rate."

Stoltenberg, to be sure, protested against the "inappropriate activities of this or that member of the board of directors of this or that federal enterprise". But he did not dare to run opposition against the roped party of the CSU.

In another prominent case, the people in Bonn have come down a peg a long time ago. Although the Federal Government and the Land Niedersachsen had reached agreement on the sale of their remaining interest in the Volkswagenwerk [Volkswagen Company] (20 percent each), Hannover suddenly no longer showed any interest.

Insiders suspect that the lady minister of economics of Niedersachsen, Birgit Breuel, member of the Volkswagen Company board of supervisors, had her mind changed by the Wolfsburg factory committee members. The representatives of the employees would not like to see the state dismissed from the responsibility for jobs.

The fact that Bonn is not really so serious about the promised withdrawal from industry is also shown when a firm is involved for which there are several interested parties. Thus two bidders interested in the Diag have already

been turned down by Bonn.

Willy Korf, who wanted to use the Diag Installation Construction and Arms Plant for the salvaging of his steel company, had as little success as his reorganizer Hanns Arnt Vogels, who in the meantime manages Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB). A sale to the half-state-owned space and arms company MBB, so the answer of Bonn, is no real privatization.

There the people in Bonn, if they want to hold on to the Diag, will now have to think of something new. For in the meantime a real private person--in Cologne chocolate manufacturer Hans Imhoff, who in the future would like to produce more than chocolate, has expressed an inclination to buy.

8970

CS0: 3620/40

PASOK PARTISAN POLICIES BLAMED FOR POOR STATE OF ECONOMY

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 4 Oct 84 p 5

/Editorial: "The 'Current' of the 'Stream'"; passages enclosed in slantlines emphasized in original/

/Text/ The average exchange rate for the dollar this year will be 115 drachmas, as long as the daily rate does not go over 130 by the end of the year. By comparison with the average rate in 1983 of 88.3 drachmas to the dollar, our national currency will have been devalued against the U.S. currency by 26 drachmas per dollar. If in addition it is correct that it costs our economy 5 billion drachmas every time the dollar goes up by one drachma, since half our imports-- \$5 billion--are priced in dollars, then in the past 12 months the rise of the dollar will have cost the economy 130 billion drachmas (5 billion times 26).

To this sum we also have to add the costs--in drachmas--of paying off principal and interest on foreign loans. Consequently the total loss from the continuing devaluation is over 150 billion drachmas. The loss comes down to around 90 billion drachmas, however, if we accept that the devaluation facilitated this year's increase in exports and encouraged tourism, so that the two together earned some \$500 million more than in 1983.

Now add the corresponding losses from the previous 2 years to this year's 90 billion "minus." In the 3 years 1982-1984, imports priced in dollars totaled \$15 billion, and the drachma was devalued by 59 to the dollar (from an average of 55.5 drachmas per dollar in 1981 to 114). Thus the economy was bled of a dizzying 800 billion drachmas over this period to pay for more expensive dollars! Moreover, the economy lost some 150 billion drachmas more in the same period, because exports and invisible revenues dropped by \$2 billion.

This trillion drachmas was taken from the Greek people, reducing their buying power through the inflation it provoked, and that buying power was only partially restored by the nominal indexing of salaries and wages. Was this inevitable?

Certainly not. To be sure, the worldwide currency upheavals caused by the rise of the dollar justify the devaluation of the drachma. However, the devaluation of our national currency does not justify the loss of so much /disposable/ income, transferred to the foreigners who supply the goods we

import and the bankers we borrow from. If this is how things were, and if the foreign exchange gained by reducing imports and increasing exports did not balance the loss in disposable income (private and public), then why do governments and trade specialists recommend devaluation as the most effective means to aid exports and multiply invisible revenues?

In the 3 years 1982-1984, the drachma was devalued by 105 percent against the dollar and by a corresponding amount against the currencies of our principal trading partners. This ought not only to have balanced the losses from the change in exchange rates but also to have left the Greek economy with a surplus. Why did just the opposite happen?

Because the economy /was prevented/ from working! From taking advantage of the chance offered by the devaluation to increase exports and reduce imports and thus, if nothing else, to escape the heavy burden of borrowing abroad. And yet the fundamental responsibility of Mr Papandreou's government in charting and carrying out its economic policy is to make the economy work.

This policy was not "planned" to increase the nation's production and workers' income by keeping people employed through concrete and effective measures. No, it was to /alter the structures/ of the economy, so that it would cease to be...exploited by multinational capital! What it actually achieved was to take away more of the nation's income and transfer it /to the foreigners/ and to increase the dependence on the capitalistic West in the effort to find the capital (through loans) to protect the ordinary man's buying power from the consequences of government policy which was supposed to favor the people.

Now, as if the "restructuring" of the economy had not done enough harm, the companies that have been put under state control in one form or another cannot function. They cannot meet their expenses. They are helping further reduce the disposable income of those who are working usefully, in order to scrape together a little income for the idle ones who are nominally "producing."

Nonetheless the government spokesman insists that all this constitutes an "irreversible stream"! That is to say that in its "current" we must certainly...drown!

12593

CS0: 3521/19

CHANGES IN ECONOMIC, PROFESSIONAL, SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS

Athens 1 KATHIMERINI in Greek 4 Oct 84 p 9

/Article: "Agricultural Population Down 2.5 Percent /sic/ in 1971-1981. Changes in Economic, Professional, Social Characteristics. Number of Wage and Salary Earners and Free Professionals Up"/

/Text/ The results of the latest population and residence census reveal significant changes in the economic, professional, and social characteristics of the population in the decade between 1971 and 1981.

The most indicative of these changes are the drop in the number of those engaged in agriculture and in the number of minors with jobs and the corresponding increase in all other groups, but particularly in the number of wage and salary earners and free professionals.

At yesterday's press conference, the National Statistical Service announced that the number of farmers and stock-breeders, formerly the largest segment in the active population, dropped by 340,000, to just 973,000. Thus from 40.6 percent of the country's active population in 1971, it fell to 27.5 percent in 1981.

There was also a significant decrease in the number of economically-active children 10-14 years old. The 67,112 working minors counted in 1971 dropped to 36,125 over the decade.

In contrast, the number of wage and salary earners went up by 310,000, from 42.3 percent of the active population in 1971 to 51 percent in 1981.

There was also an increase of 149,000 in the number of free professionals. As a percentage of the population they went up from 5.7 percent to 9.4 in 1981.

Other changes reflected in the latest census results are:

--The economically active population increased from the 3.235 million of the previous census in 1971 to 3.546 million. This represents a rise of 10 percent in the 10 years. The number of economically active males went up 11 percent, and of females 5 percent.

--The noneconomically active population showed much greater growth in 1971-1981, rising by 708,000, or 19 percent. In this group the number of males increased by 29 percent, the number of females by 9 percent.

--Sixty-five percent of males 10 years old and up are economically active, while the corresponding figure for women is just 23 percent. In the previous census of 1971, these percentages were higher, at 66 and 24 percent respectively.

--As a percentage of the population, managers and senior civil servants increased from 0.6 percent in 1971 to 1.7 percent in 1981.

--Office workers went from 7.5 percent to 9.5.

--Merchants and sales people went from 7.2 percent to 8.5.

--The proportion of those in services went from 7.4 percent to 7.8.

--Artisans and laborers went from 29.9 percent to 31.6.

The changes in total employment by occupation are as follows:

--in agriculture, from 40.6 percent in 1971 to 27.5 in 1981.

--in mines and quarries, from 0.6 percent to 0.7.

--in industry and handicrafts, from 17.1 percent to 18.7.

--for electricity and natural gas workers, the percentage stayed at 0.8 percent.

--in construction and public works, from 7.9 percent to 9.2.

--in commerce, from 11.2 percent to 12.2.

--in transportation and communications, from 6.5 percent to 7.5.

--in banking and insurance, from 2.4 percent to 3.6.

--in other services, from 10.8 percent to 15.0.

--finally, employment in miscellaneous occupations rose from 2.0 percent in 1971 to 4.9 in 1981.

12593

CSO: 3521/19

EVO, PYRKAL ARMS MANUFACTURES CONTRASTED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 4 Oct 84 p 9

/Commentary by Nikos Nikolaou: "A Successful Model of State Enterprise: Greek Arms Industry"/

/Text/ Recent contrasting developments in the arms industry, which is so important strategically and nationally, deserve attention not only from the government but also more widely. We should use these developments as a springboard for all of us to agree on certain rules of behavior which could be the salvation of our tottering economy.

There are two groups active in the arms industry, both entirely state-controlled: PYRKAL /Powder and Cartridge Works/ and EVO /Greek Arms Industry/. The former happens to have been the first company to be socialized and has gone from bad to worse ever since the PASOK government used various ploys to take it out of the hands of private capital. In the roughly 2 years that PYRKAL has been socialized, it has changed management three times, has become the arena for the most frenzied infighting among PASOK cliques, has piled up billions in debts, and is threatened today with total collapse. This is the culmination of the agony of its thousands of employees, who are in danger of losing their jobs under a socialist government.

The second company, EVO, was founded in 1977 by the Greek state to supply the Greek armed forces with small arms. It is already a thriving enterprise which is growing steadily stronger, creating wealth and new jobs, while at the same time saving the nation valuable foreign exchange. In 1980, sales were only 843 million drachmas, but in 1983 they amounted to 8 billion drachmas. Thus sales increased by 10 times during a period of difficulties not only for our economy but also for all international trade. Net profits rose sharply from 53 million drachmas to 810 million in 1983. This underlines that fact that there do exist state industries capable of more than just not wasting society's resources and scraping by on government subsidies. Some can actually compete on equal terms with the most profitable private enterprises. Finally, it is worth noting that EVO not only supplies the Greek armed forces with the items it was founded to produce but has also developed into a leading exporter. In 1983 it succeeded in exporting 71 percent of its total production.

This prosperity is not limited to just the company itself. In the last 2 years it has taken over two troubled companies, Geniki Mikhaniki and Metallourgiki Ipeirou. It has cleaned them up and made them part of a development plan that is now beginning to bear fruit. Today with four factories, EVO is a beehive of activity that is promoting domestic technology, not only in the arms industry but also in nonmilitary production, since it has laid the groundwork to create a machine tool industry for the first time.

Journalists from Athens visited the group's factories a few days ago and were truly impressed by what they saw. They told Vikentios Arsenis, president of the company's administrative council, that the contrasting developments in the arms industry--EVO's progress compared to PYRKAL's collapse--can only be interpreted in the following ways: EVO is doing well either because it is a modern industry, or because it enjoys good management, or because the company's president has help from his brother, who as minister of national economy provides preferential treatment.

Naturally Vikentios Arsenis chose the second interpretation: good, proper management. Indeed it might be difficult to deny him that, since the journalists themselves found the president and a team of young executives working with enthusiasm, confidence, and dedication to advance the firm.

Vikentios Arsenis, who has served as EVO's chief executive since its foundation, has the right philosophy on how state enterprises should be managed. He believes that the government and the ministers responsible should give management the clearest possible targets and then leave it free to achieve them, only checking the final results. Management, that is, should be relatively free as to the ways and means of achieving the mutual goals, so that it can take effective action on its own initiative. If on the other hand the state intervenes continuously and deprives management of all initiative, then it turns management into a passive instrument with a civil service mentality, and as a result the company goes from bad to worse.

There may be other sides to the question. Still, it is a fact that EVO presents a different development model for state enterprises, and at the moment it happens to be a very successful one.

12593

CSO: 3521/19

IRAN DEMANDING BARTER FOR OIL AS TRADE CONDITION

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 16 Oct 84 p 35

[Article by Anders Mellbourn]

[Text] In order for the rapid Swedish export increase to Iran to continue, Sweden will have to buy oil from Iran. In the past Swedish firms could get export licenses by making corresponding purchases of oil. But now Iran wants an increase in general trade.

Back in the spring of 1983 when undersecretary Carl-Johan Aberg of the Foreign Ministry visited Iran the Iranians received their first positive indication that Sweden was prepared to buy more oil in an effort to partially offset Iran's big deficit in its trade balance with Sweden. That commitment led to a government decision this year instructing Swedish Petroleum to buy Iranian oil valued at 100 million kronor for the National Economic Defense Board, OEF. But the transaction could not be concluded since the two sides could not agree on the price per barrel.

The price is an especially sensitive issue for the Swedish negotiators, since OEF does not need extra oil but has instead been asked by the government to reduce its reserves. Therefore Sweden would have to sell this oil to someone else.

The background to the Iranian oil affair, which attracted a great deal of attention, lies in the unparalleled Swedish export increase to Iran in recent years. Both in 1982 and in 1983 export volume rose by hundreds of percentage points. In 1983 Swedish exports to Iran amounted to a value of 3.3 billion kronor. This year the increase will not be that big. Those familiar with Swedish trade to the Middle East estimate that the value of exports will be around 3.5 billion kronor. But Iran has already taken over Iraq's place in Swedish export statistics and is now competing with Saudi Arabia for the position of Sweden's most important trade partner in the region.

Good Reputation

And there is great optimism in Swedish banking and industrial circles that the increase can continue. And this in spite of the Islamic revolution and in spite of Iran having been at war with Iraq for several years.

There are several reasons for the Swedish gains and development opportunities. Even when the shah was still in power Swedish industry gained a strong position in Iran. The good reputation from that period has lived on under the new regime. Sweden and Swedish firms are also regarded as being politically non-controversial, so that Swedish exports have benefited from Iran's breach with the United States and France in particular.

Swedish firms also sell products that Iran is especially anxious to get. They include trucks, highway machinery, wood and paper.

Both Saab-Scania and Volvo now send a substantial proportion of their truck exports to Iran. This has led to a debate in this country since trucks have a strategic military importance in a warring country.

In other respects as well the Swedish export increase to Iran, a country under a harsh religious dictatorship, has led to some moral and political criticism. But from a purely economic point of view Swedish bankers and businessmen are very positive about Iran. The Iranians pay in cash and banks and financial institutions are run very competently, those familiar with Iran stressed to DAGENS NYHETER.

Imbalance

But Iran wants to sell things to Sweden as well as buy things from us. In 1983 the value of Iran's sales to Sweden was around 1 billion kronor compared to purchases three times that amount. Almost the entire amount came from two offsetting purchases made in the fall of 1982. Sweden agreed to purchase oil if Swedish firms could get licenses to export to Iran.

Counter purchases of this kind have become increasingly common with both developing nations and the state trade lands of eastern Europe. In principle they conflict with the Swedish principles of free trade. But they are still accepted more or less enthusiastically by both politicians and businessmen who consider them necessary.

So far in 1984 Swedish imports from Iran have been insignificant. Work is being done to arrange counter purchases. But this time Iran does not want one big counter purchasing agreement with Sweden but wants an increase in general trade. DAGENS NYHETER has learned that Iran has ideological as well as purely materialistic trade reasons for this.

Ideologically Iran wants to show that it is now a more developed industrial nation that no longer engages in barter agreements. From a purely mathematical point of view the Iranians feel that in any case the imbalance in Swedish-Iranian trade is too great.

6578

CSO: 3650/29

BRIEFS

GAS RESERVES FALL—The Hague, 15 Oct--Estimated natural gas reserves in the Netherlands fell by 30 billion cubic metres to 2,050 billion cubic metres in the first half of 1984, Economic Affairs Minister Gijs van Aardenne said today. In a letter to the second chamber of parliament, the minister said 45 billion cubic metres of gas had been produced in the first six months (43 billion cubic metres), but the discovery of six new deposits, plus revisions, had added 15 billion cubic metres to the estimates. The confirmed reserves totalled 1,910 billion cubic metres on July 1 this year. Three of the new deposits were discovered on land, three on the Continental Shelf, bringing the total of known deposits on land to 87 and in the Dutch section of the North Sea to 77. [Text] [The Hague ANP NEWS BULLETIN in English 16 Oct 84 p 5]

CSO: 3600/2

TOWARD REGIONAL OBSTACLES TO ATATURK DAM PROJECT

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 21 Oct 84 p 6

[Text] I've just had the opportunity to view three dam sites within the space of a week. I went to the construction site of the Ataturk Dam at Urfa, observed construction on the Karakaya Dam between Malatya and Elazig, and toured the Keban Dam at Elazig as well. The Keban Dam is 160 kilometers upstream from the Karakaya Dam, while the Karakaya is 180 kilometers upstream from the Ataturk Dam.

All of them control the waters of the Euphrates.

The Keban and Karakaya are primarily intended for energy production. The water, after powering the turbines, goes back into the Euphrates. Evaporation from these two dams certainly doesn't lead to much water loss, either. The Ataturk Dam, however, is primarily intended for irrigation, in addition to the energy it will produce.

The water collected behind the Ataturk Dam will irrigate a total of 727,400 hectares of land: 150,000 hectares on the Urfa-Harran plain and 342,100 hectares on the Mardin-Ceylanpinar plains, both by means of the Urfa tunnel, and, by pumping, 180,000 hectares on the Siverek-Hilvan and upper-Mardin plateaus and 53,300 hectares in the Bozova region. With the addition of another 142,300 hectares from the Suruc-Baziki Project, the total area of land benefitting from irrigation from the Ataturk Dam will rise to 870,000 hectares.

This water will not go back into the Euphrates.

After the Euphrates exits Turkey it enters Syria; after passing almost the entire length of that country it flows into Iraq where, in conjunction with the Tigris, it forms Mesopotamia and eventually empties into the Persian Gulf.

The Euphrates is a vital artery for both of these countries, especially Syria.

For years it has been said that "The Euphrates flows, and the Turks just look on." Now, with the Keban, the first obstruction of the Euphrates' flow is in place. The Karakaya will be the second of these, and the Ataturk Dam the third.

There are also dam projects on the Tigris, even if not of the same scale.

While I was touring the Ataturk, Karakaya, and Keban Dams, the most recent incidents on our southeastern border were attracting everyone's attention.

There's no one who doesn't know how hard Syria and Iraq tried to prevent these dams from being built -- to make it impossible for them to be built -- or the tricks they pulled with foreign circles to obstruct the dams' financing, and even the way tried to get certain international institutions to act in the matter.

There is no need to condemn them for this, though, for certainly everyone will do whatever his interests require. One shouldn't expect friendship from an enemy. Turkey, in its use of the two rivers, behaves carefully in accordance with international rules of equity. The Syrians, in particular, register complaints from time to time and, not being satisfied with our responses, even send delegations to the Keban to observe the situation with their own eyes. For Turkey to exert control over the waters of the Euphrates, even if no one's rights are violated, disturbs our neighbors whose consciences vis-a-vis Turkey are none too clear.

The fact that the Ataturk Dam is under construction, its problems resolved and both domestic and foreign financing assured, and that it is planned to be completed within ten years, may have spurred recourse to a "last chance effort."

Moreover, the prosperity that the irrigation potential of the Ataturk Dam will bring to the region will render ineffective a number of the weapons that have been utilized to incite the people of the region. Without adding increased wealth to the region, it is impossible to raise the local population's standard of living. Even if every mention of "neglect by successive governments" and every criticism are valid, the basic underlying problem is the region's unsuitable natural environment. The dams are the best man-made means of remedying this situation. This being the case, there is nothing surprising about the fact that those made uneasy by the dams on account of the water situation are making common cause with those forces which seek to divide Turkey.

Their goal is to divert Turkey from its course.

Turkey must not fall into the traps set for this purpose. The first task is a sound evaluation of the situation. To carry out operations as if the region were about to be overrun by foreigners will cause our enemies to rub their hands with satisfaction, for this is not in fact their goal at all, and is not even possible. The most essential point is that the people not see the state as being hostile or characterized by any unnecessary harshness, and that they not fall into the belief that it has targetted them as enemies. Naturally when a house is to be searched one does not knock at the door bearing a bouquet of flowers, but such tasks can still be carried out successfully without engaging in behavior that could be termed "mistreatment." I have heard with my own ears that rumors of this type have begun to be spread

in the region, and I consider that the real aim of the actions in question is to bring about just such a situation. No good will come from either under-estimating or exaggerating the problem. The matter consists in making a sound evaluation and then keeping everything in just the right proportion.

This is true for the government in power, the opposition, and us in the press as well. To do otherwise is to play into the hands of the enemy.

9173

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GOVERNMENT PRESENTS ENVIRONMENT REPORT TO PARLIAMENT

Helsinki HUFUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 29 Sep 84 p 9

[Article: "Report to Parliament: 'Share of Environmental Protection in GNP not Growing'"]

[Text] The possibility of citizens for influencing planning and decision-making in matters concerning their environment will have to be increased. Employees shall, where possible, be allowed to intervene in situations where their work places have a harmful effect on the environment. The objective is, moreover, for the municipal boards to grant permission for arrangements which, to a considerable extent, will affect the environment.

The above recommendations were included in the government's environment policy report which was presented to parliament last Friday. According to the report, the economy will have to be adapted to the structural changes which will be effected by the environmental protection board in order not to upset the production and the basis for the welfare of the society. Economic growth need not conflict automatically with the objectives of environmental protection, but the objectives are often interdependent.

The government states that the share of the gross national product for which the environmental protection sector accounts need not be increased despite more effective environment protection measures.

The environment policy report--a bulky volume with central guidelines concerning environment policy measures--was presented by Minister of Environment Matti Ahde. The debate on the report will begin next Wednesday with group statements; the parliament will make no decision on the basis of the report.

The government points out that the economic benefit of more effective environmental protection clearly exceeds the costs of environmental protection: it pays to protect the environment. The rate of employment increases; the investments are excellent measures for equalization of market fluctuations and, in addition, new technology is encouraged.

The government now, moreover, promises to set up a committee to study in detail the economic aspects of environmental protection and to lay the foundation for a preventive environment policy, the economic effect of which will

be as favorable as possible. Environmental protection must be as inexpensive as possible.

Those Who Cause Damage to the Environment Will Have to Pay for It

The central principle underlying the financing of the costs of environmental protection is still the principle which says that enterprises and communities which cause damage to the environment will have to pay for the prevention of such damage and will have to defray the costs of the repair of the environment. The committee will thus be given the task of working out a system for the distribution of the various costs. In addition, the committee would be exploring the possibilities of setting up a special environment protection fund.

In addition to the principle referred to above, the government states that the principle of the best available technology ought to be observed. Those using technology should thus participate in its development. From the point of view of environmental protection, it is generally more profitable to effect changes of process than to carry through a so-called external purification process of discharges. The said principle, moreover, presupposes that the environmental pollutant is not shifted from one sector to the other, for example from water to the air.

Expanded environmental research, reduced sulphur discharges, more effective handling of problem waste, better dumps, increased and more effective control of the use of chemicals, increased industrial waste protection, increased noise protections--these are among the most important promises made by the government in its report.

The government promises, among other things that "for the implementation of the decision in principle on the environmental protection program, the necessary allocations and other resources will be made available, where possible."

Under an international agreement, Finland has undertaken to reduce, by the year 1993, its total discharge of sulphur by at least 30 percent, compared to its discharge in 1980, which, converted into sulphur, amounted to approximately 600,000 tons. According to the report, a program will become ready next year for a reduction of the sulphur discharges. The same year, i.e. in 1985, a decision will also be made concerning the measures to be taken to effect the said reduction. The measures will be so planned that the discharges, by the end of the nineties, will be reduced by 50 percent compared to the level in the year 1980. The government has also de facto already made a decision to reduce the discharges from traffic--according to the promise, motorists may, if they so desire, obtain unleaded gasoline already in the late eighties. The government, furthermore, promises more stringent conditions for permits for industry and communities in the area of waste water networks.

Combating Oil Pollution

The report, moreover, states that the capacity for combating oil pollution will have to be improved. A development plan is under preparation for reinforcement, in particular, of the organization combating oil pollution. To combat oil pollution at sea, a regional organization will be set up. According to the government, it will, moreover, become important to increase the amount of equipment--new vessels to combat oil pollution at sea will be promised. The central administration will, moreover, be provided with increased preparedness through increases in its personnel.

The measures provided under the law governing waste handling will be transferred to the water and environment protection board which will be set up within the Ministry of Environment in the year 1986. The control of waste handling in the municipalities will, in turn, be transferred to the environment protection authorities, the government states. A bill governing municipal environment protection committees will be presented shortly.

The wording of the report, however, leaves room for alternatives: allocations may, "if possible," be increased, it says. On the use of harmful chemicals, it says, among other things, that the use of PCB [polychlorinated biphenyls] "ought to cease entirely within the next few years," and, furthermore, that "it has been proposed to restrict the use of cadmium." In addition, it says that the use of phenyl chloride "will probably become prohibited." "If feasible," the allocations for nationwide environment protection organizations, such as the Society for the Protection of Nature and Nature and Environment, will also be increased.

7262
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REPORT ON LINKS BETWEEN AIR POLLUTION, DYING FORESTS

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 2 Oct 84 p 20

[Article: "Dying Forests and Air Pollution"]

[Text] The Executive Federal Council's report on the dying of forests states that primarily domestically caused air pollution is the main cause of the chronic poisoning of the trees and that the planned lowering of the exhaust emission level to the level of 1950 will require a 90 percent reduction of the nitric oxide, which is, above all, caused by motorized traffic.

Without Air Pollution, No Dying Forests

The partial report on "Dying Forests and Air Pollution" of the EDI (NZZ Nr. 213), approved by the Executive Federal Council on 12 September, and which will be followed up by a list of measures to be taken, provides an overview of the damages being inflicted and the causes of the dying of the forests in Switzerland, which have been diagnosed as chronic poisoning.

Since last fall, when 14 percent of the woodland trees were affected, the share of sick trees has clearly increased, a fact which is already reflected in a noticeably increasing rate of forced utilization of the trees and which gives rise to the expectation that within short and medium-length time periods catastrophic locally limited effects will be felt, particularly in the mountainous areas. The dying of forests, which is today rampant in our country and abroad, is a new phenomenon without any historical parallel and the consequence of a chronic poisoning, the primary cause of which is considered by international experts to be "a clear case of steadily increasing air pollution which has been going on for many years," a fact which was also generally recognized by the 31 signatories of the concluding document of the multinational environmental conference held in Munich in June 1984.

On the other hand, weather and climatic factors, such as drought and cold, and so forth, and lacking nutrients, parasites, and faulty forestry practices and cultivation, are not considered to be primary causes, since the dying of forests takes place in even the best cultivated forest stands. It is, however, possible for such secondary causes as, for instance, the bark-beetle, additionally to worsen the condition of already weakened stands.

Sufficient Proof for Undertaking Practical Measures

Classical smoke damage to forests in the vicinity of hard-coal-burning heating installations, and metal and aluminum foundries has been known for a long time. The fact that air pollution is primarily responsible also today for the widely-spread dying of woods far from where the emissions originate is known from, among other things, gassing experiments, for instance with sulfur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide, the combination of which has a more poisonous effect than single harmful gasses; from the spreading of forest damage, including the meteorologically influenced harmful-substance concentrations (epidemiological infection); from investigations concerning the movement of harmful substances and their transformation en route from the emission site to the site of their precipitation, from evidence of concentrations of harmful substances in spruce-fir needles, and from examinations of annual growth rings, which show that the share of trees suffering from stunted growth has been increasing steadily since the 1950s.

In connection with the damage caused to forests, sulfur dioxide, nitric oxide, and hydrocarbons are the primary initial causative substances. To be sure these substances are also formed in nature in insignificant quantities, but their man-caused share in areas with a high industrial and traffic density such as Switzerland amounts to more than 95 percent for sulfur dioxide and nitric oxides, and to 90 percent for hydrocarbons. The sulfur dioxide emissions predominantly stem from industrial and home heating installations, over 80 percent of the nitric oxides come from motor vehicle traffic, and both emitters contribute approximately one-half of the hydrocarbons. While the sulfur dioxide content has been going down since 1970 and has today once again receded to the level of 1960, the exhaust emissions of nitric oxide have been steadily increasing and are today approximately 25 times higher than they were in 1950. Including industrial and housing heating systems, in which areas nitric oxide emissions are going down slightly, nitric oxide emissions are today nine times higher than they were in 1950.

Imported or "Home-made"?

Because on their way from the emission site to the place of precipitation the primary harmful substances are transformed into even more harmful substances and mutually reinforce each other's harmful effects, the damage done to the forests is not limited to the vicinity of cities and highways, in spite of their rapid dissipation process. Among others, the

report cites as examples the formation of "acid rain" from sulfur dioxide and nitric oxide, and the formation of ozone from nitric oxide and hydrocarbons under the influence of intensive sun radiation, the harmful effects of which are strongest at varying distances from the emission site, depending on the particular substance involved, the weather, and the time of day and year. To be sure, the concentration of nitric oxides themselves in the vicinity of the emitter in many places exceeds several times the border norms applicable for the protection of human health. In the area of Switzerland, only the import share of acid sulfur compounds is of significance. Such gases as sulfur dioxide, nitric oxide, as well as acid rain from nitric oxide compounds stem from local and regional sources, i.e. from Switzerland itself. From this it follows that the burden of forest-damaging harmful substances can be effectively counteracted on the national level.

Conclusion

The conclusion drawn in the report is to the effect that the dying of our forests is for our country an actually existing threat and, as an objective for our forestry, it is proposed that the air pollution be reduced to the level existing in the 1950-1960 period. Whereas the sulfur dioxide, which primarily stems from oil-burning heating equipment, would have to be reduced by one-half in order to attain the 1950 level, the hydrocarbons, half of which come from motor vehicle traffic, and the 80 percent nitric oxide emissions coming from motor vehicle traffic, require a 70 percent reduction for attainment of the 1960 level, or even a 90 percent reduction for attainment of the 1950 level, whereby also the high ozone concentrations, which occur in large areas, would be lowered to a tolerable level.

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